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Trade Secrecy and Innovation in Forensic
Technology
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Trade secrecy is a major barrier to public scrutiny of probabilistic software tools that are
increasingly used at all stages of the criminal system, from policing and investigation through
trial and sentencing. Such tools allow prosecutors to leverage imperfect forensic evidence, such
as DNA mixtures, smudged fingerprints, and grainy video footage. Probabilistic software tools
unavoidably rely on potentially contestable assumptions, parameters, and implementation
choices. Judicially recognized trade secrecy in criminal cases impedes scrutiny of these tools by
defendants and the public. Previous critics have focused on secrecy’s potential to undermine the
integrity and fairness of the criminal justice system, invoking the constitutional constraints of
criminal procedure, as well as the traditional accuracy and fairness grounds of evidentiary rules.
This Article takes a complementary perspective, arguing that trade secrecy against courtmandated disclosure is also unlikely to advance the recognized goals of trade secrecy law. There
is thus certainly no basis for courts to assume that the social benefits of trade secrecy outweigh
the potential for injustice created by withholding information needed for adversarial vetting of
the reliability of forensic evidence tools.
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INTRODUCTION
The criminal justice system increasingly relies on probabilistic algorithms
at all stages from policing and investigation1 through trial and sentencing.2 These
software-implemented algorithms are used for various purposes including
estimating the likelihood that imperfect evidence, such as DNA mixtures,
smudged fingerprints and grainy video footage, is associated with a particular
suspect, as well as predicting whether a person is likely to commit a crime if
released before trial or on parole and directing policing resources.3 One common
thread among these tools is their reliance on computational techniques that
embed contestable choices, parameters, and assumptions. These tools, and the
efforts by their developers to shield their underlying source code from
disclosure, have been the subject of considerable public and scholarly debate
and have recently spurred activism from a perhaps surprising group—
mathematicians. In October 2020, the Notices of the American Mathematical
Society published a letter with over 2,000 signatories calling for mathematicians
to sever ties with police departments and to “demand that any algorithm with
potential high impact face a public audit.”4
Trade secrecy is one major obstacle to the scrutiny called for by these
mathematicians and many other commentators. This Article focuses on
assertions of trade secrecy regarding probabilistic software algorithms used to
produce evidence for criminal trials. While questions about the “black box
dangers” of non-transparent forensic technologies are hardly new,5 the issue is
of growing practical importance because of the growing reliance on probabilistic
1. In essence, predictive policing is an algorithm-based method/analysis that uses large data sets to
forecast crime, but there are concerns that the underlying algorithms play a greater role in reinforcing racial bias
than in successfully predicting criminal behavior. See Tim Lau, Predictive Policing Explained, BRENNAN CTR.
(Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/predictive-policing-explained.
2. Recidivism risk assessment tools are algorithms that purport to calculate the likelihood an offender will
commit another crime in the future. These risk assessment tools assign a predictive score to an individual based
on a dataset comprised of crime and offender statistics. Commentators have noted that the datasets are often
incomplete or inaccurate, and that there is little reason to believe that the data in the datasets are sufficiently
accurate to make accurate or meaningful recidivism predictions. Stephanie Lacambra, Jeremy Gillula & Jamie
Williams, Recidivism Risk Assessments Won’t Fix the Criminal Justice System, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec.
21, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/12/recidivism-risk-assessments-wont-fix-criminal-justicesystem.
3. See Rebecca Wexler, It’s Time to End the Trade Secret Evidentiary Privilige Among Forensic
Algorithm Vendors, BROOKINGS (July 13, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/07/13/its-timeto-end-the-trade-secret-evidentiary-privilege-among-forensic-algorithm-vendors; Lacambra et al., supra note 2.
4. Tarik Aougab, Federico Ardila, Jayadev Athreya, Edray Goins, Christopher Hoffman, Autumn Kent,
Lily Khadjavi, Cathy O’Neil, Priyam Patel & Katrin Wehrheim, Letter to the Editor, 67 NOTICES AM.
MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 1293 (2020); Lilah Burke, Mathematicians Urge Ending Work With Police,
INSIDEHIGHERED.COM (June 24, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/06/24/mathematiciansurge-cutting-ties-police; see also Ethan Zell, Let’s Take Responsibility For Our Math, AMS: BLOGS (June 27,
2020), https://blogs.ams.org/mathgradblog/2020/06/27/lets-take-responsibility-for-our-math.
5. See Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245 (2016); Jessica Gabel Cino, Deploying the
Secret Police: The Use of Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1073 (2018); Charles
Short, Guilt by Machine: The Problem of Source Code Discovery in Florida DUI Prosecutions, 61 FLA. L.
REV. 177 (2009).
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software algorithms in the criminal justice system.6 Unlike more traditional
forensic analyses performed in crime labs, probabilistic software tools are
commonly procured from private companies, which assert trade secrecy not only
to avoid disclosure in court, but also to keep information secret from the crime
labs, law enforcement agencies, and prosecutors who are their primary
customers. Judges have been perhaps surprisingly willing to deny disclosure to
defendants on trade secrecy grounds. As a result of these technological and
judicial trends, trade secret algorithms increasingly underlie evidence offered at
the pre-trial, trial, and sentencing phases and undoubtedly cast shadows beyond
the courtroom to plea bargaining and charging decisions.7
We are not the first to criticize courts’ willingness to accept trade secrecy
as reason for denying disclosure of the underpinnings of forensic evidence.
Previous critiques have centered on secrecy’s potential to undermine the
integrity and fairness of the criminal justice system,8 invoking the constitutional
constraints of criminal procedure, as well as the traditional accuracy and fairness
grounds of evidentiary rules. For example, the Justice in Forensic Algorithms
Act of 2019 (reintroduced in April 2021 as the Justice in Forensic Algorithms
Act of 2021)9 aimed “[t]o prohibit the use of trade secrets privileges to prevent
6. To our knowledge, the first judicial opinion analyzing whether trade secrecy could preclude discovery
of the software used to produce forensic evidence was issued in 2006 and dealt with breath alcohol testing. See
Moe v. State, 944 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA, Nov. 17, 2006). Nonetheless, while several other courts dealt with
breathalyzer software in the following years, it was not until 2013 that criminal courts began to issue opinions
addressing trade secrecy claims for other software-based forensic evidence tools. See United States v. Ocasio,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79313 (W.D. Tex. June 6, 2013). The first opinion specifically considering an assertion
of a trade secret privilege in a criminal case was written even more recently, in 2015. See State v. Superior Court
(Chubbs), B258569 2015 WL 139069 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2015).
7. See, e.g., Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972 (2017); Meghan J. Ryan, Secret
Conviction Programs, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 269 (2020).
8. See, e.g., Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal
Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018); Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U. L.
REV. 659 (2017–2018); Jennifer N. Mellon, Manufacturing Convictions: Why Defendants Are Entitled to the
Data Underlying Forensic DNA Kits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1097, 1119 (2001); Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Susan
Landau & Brian Owsley, Seeking the Source: Criminal Defendants’ Constitutional Right to Source Code, 17 OH.
ST. TECH L.J. 1 (2021); Vera Eidelman, The First Amendment Case for Public Access to Secret Algorithms Used
in Criminal Trials, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 915 (2018); Jeanna Matthews, Marzieh Babaeianjelodar, Stephen
Lorenz, Abigail Matthews, Mariama Njie, Nathaniel Adams, Dan Krane, Jessica Goldthwaite & Clinton Hughes,
The Right to Confront Your Accusers: Opening the Black Box of Forensic DNA Software, in AIES ‘19:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2019 AAAI/ACM CONFERENCE ON AI, ETHICS & SOCIETY 321 (2019), https://doi.org/
10.1145/3306618.3314279.
9. Press Release, Rep. Mark Takano, Reps. Takano and Evans Reintroduce the Justice in Forensic
Algorithms Act to Protect Defendants’ Due Process Rights in the Criminal Justice System (Apr. 8, 2021),
https://takano.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/reps-takano-and-evans-reintroduce-the-justice-in-forensicalgorithms-act-to-protect-defendants-due-process-rights-in-the-criminal-justice-system. At the time of writing,
the 2021 Bill had been referred to both the Committee on the Judiciary (Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security) and the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology (Subcommittee on Research
and Technology). H.R. 2438, 117th Cong. (2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/
2438/all-actions?s=1&r=3. The two versions of the Bill share the same core purpose, but there are several
changes worth noting. For example, the stated purpose of the 2019 Bill was to establish “Computational Forensic
Algorithm Standards,” while the stated purpose of the 2021 Bill is to establish “Computational Forensic
Algorithm Testing Standards” as well as a new “Computational Forensic Algorithm Testing Program.” Compare
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defense access to evidence in criminal proceedings, provide for the
establishment of Computational Forensic Algorithm Standards, and for other
purposes.”10 In introducing the legislation, Representative Mark Takano (DCal.) emphasized that “[t]he trade secrets privileges of software developers
should never trump the due process rights of defendants in the criminal justice
system.”11 Despite the weight of these critiques, judges mostly continue to deny
disclosure about forensic technologies in response to trade secrecy assertions.12
Moreover, judicial opinions in this area reflect an assumption that standard
innovation-based justifications for trade secrecy are persuasive in this context.
For example, the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s seminal decision denying
disclosure of probabilistic genotyping source code in a criminal case noted that
“TrueAllele is proprietary software; it would not be possible to market
TrueAllele if it were available for free.”13 A fortiori, these disclosure denials
cannot be justified if they do not even advance trade secrecy’s conventional
policy goals. We therefore analyze whether standard justifications for legal trade
secrecy protection are applicable to forensic evidence technology. Our analysis
is thus complementary to critiques based on the importance of disclosure to the
integrity of the justice system. We conclude that there is no basis for assuming
that the purported social benefits of trade secrecy outweigh the potential for
injustice created by withholding information needed for adversarial vetting of
the reliability of forensic evidence tools. Indeed, trade secrecy’s justifications
are largely inapplicable to court-ordered disclosures about forensic evidence
technology.
This Article focuses on probabilistic software-implemented tools, for
which trade secrecy is particularly troublesome because of their reliance on
embedded assumptions.14 Our analysis is illustrated and informed by a detailed

H.R. 4368 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/4368/text with H.R.
2438, 117th Cong. (2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/2438/all-actions?s=1&r=3.
Although Article V of the 2019 version of the Bill aimed to remove trade secrecy protections in any criminal
case when defendants would otherwise be entitled to obtain evidence, Article 2(b) of the 2021 Bill merely states
that “There shall be no trade secret evidentiary privilege to withhold relevant evidence in criminal proceedings
in the United States courts.” H.R. 2438 117th Cong. § 2(b)(1) (2021) (emphasis added). Importantly, the 2021
version of the Bill also clarified that the defendant shall have access to the source code of the computational
forensic software. H.R. 2438 117th Cong. § 2(f) (2021).
10. H.R. 4368 116th Cong. (2019).
11. Press Release, supra note 9; see, e.g., H.B. 118. 65th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2019) (requiring
pretrial risk assessment algorithms be “transparent” and further specifying that “[n]o builder or user or a pretrial
risk assessment algorithm may assert trade secret or other protections in order to quash discovery in a criminal
matter by a party to a criminal case”).
12. See infra Part III.D.4.
13. Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 889 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). Other opinions reflect similar
concerns. See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 23 N.Y.S.3d 820, 829 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. 2015) (“To the extent they claim
it would be easier to perform the calculations with the actual program software, the computer program itself is
proprietary and the court is not ordering its disclosure.”).
14. Bellovin et al., supra note 8, at 1–2; Katherine Kwong, Note, The Algorithm Says You Did It: The Use
of Black Box Algorithms to Analyze Complex DNA Evidence, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 275, 290 (2017); Bess
Stiffelman, No Longer the Gold Standard: Probabilistic Genotyping is Changing the Nature of DNA Evidence
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case study of probabilistic genotyping, a technique for analyzing DNA samples
that is often used in trials for serious crimes and has been at the center of
considerable recent controversy. Probabilistic genotyping (“PG”) employs
computational optimization techniques to analyze DNA evidence that is not
amenable to gold standard direct comparison approaches, often because it
contains mixtures of DNA from several unknown individuals.15 Probabilistic
genotyping is a useful case study because it has been around long enough for
market trends in its adoption and use to be observed.16 Moreover, trade secrecybased refusals to disclose PG source code and other implementation details have
been repeatedly challenged by defendants over the past seven or eight years,17
with little success, producing a rich judicial record.
United States federal and state trade secrecy laws are violated when trade
secret information is misappropriated. Obtaining the same information through
independent derivation or reverse engineering, however, is perfectly
legitimate.18 Legal trade secrecy protection has two main policy justifications,
both grounded in concerns about market failure. First, trade secrecy law aims to
help ensure a well-functioning market by punishing misappropriation and
deterring wasteful investments in an economic espionage arms race. Second, as
a practical matter, secrecy can enhance incentives to invest in innovation by
preventing competitors from free riding on those investments. By deterring
misappropriation, trade secrecy laws can also bolster those incentives. Of
course, this incentive enhancement occurs only for information that can be kept
secret in the first place and is not adequately covered by other intellectual
property protections. Moreover, the free rider justification involves inevitable
tradeoffs, well recognized in intellectual property law, between the social
benefits of the incentives provided by market exclusivity and the social benefits
of competition.
As this Article explains in detail, these standard trade secrecy justifications
are weak for forensic evidence technologies because the feared market failures
are simply unlikely to arise. Most obviously, the first set of concerns about
economic espionage and misappropriation are simply irrelevant to court-ordered
disclosures. As explained in detail below, court-ordered disclosures are also
unlikely to raise the second set of concerns about competitor free riding. Markets
for forensic evidence technology are quite different from the consumer product
markets that have shaped trade secrecy law and policy. Demand in such markets
is dominated by concerns about admissibility, and hence shaped by evidence
in Criminal Trials, 24 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 110, 113 (2019); Katherine L. Moss, Note, The Admissibility of
TrueAllele: A Computerized DNA Interpretation System, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1033, 1072 (2015).
15. Stiffelman, supra note 14, at 118.
16. History, CYBERGENTIC, https://www.cybgen.com/company/history.shtml (last visited Mar. 21, 2022).
17. See, e.g., People v. Wakefield, 9 N.Y.S.3d 540, 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015); People v. Dominguez, 239
Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 75, 77 (Ct. App. 2018).
18. See, e.g., Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 623, 630
(2013).
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doctrine and judicial rulings. Judicial admissibility rulings build upon one
another in a classic “rich get richer” fashion, creating a barrier to entry by
competing firms. Those first mover advantages create barriers to entry that tend
to outweigh the advantages that disclosure gives to potential free riders in this
context.
Moreover, secrecy regarding the underpinnings of forensic technology is
likely to exacerbate a different sort of market failure. The social benefits of
markets depend on their ability to ensure the production of socially valuable
goods and services by responding to customer preferences.19 In forensic
technology markets, law enforcement agencies and individual crime labs are the
dominant customers, whose preferences guide producers. Unlike ordinary
consumers, however, these customers serve as purchase agents for society. They
are imperfect agents, however, because they are rewarded directly for solving
crimes and convicting perpetrators and only indirectly, at best, for avoiding
mistaken arrests and convictions.20 This misalignment is a classic principalagent problem, which evidence doctrine, judicial gatekeeping, and the
adversarial process are intended to address. These realignment mechanisms
cannot work, however, if the technology is not disclosed or adequately validated.
Trade secrecy, along with shortcomings in validation requirements,21
undermines the efficacy of these mechanisms, especially for probabilistic
software tools. As a result, market demand will tend to deviate from society’s
goals and steer innovation in sub-optimal directions.
Part I of this Article motivates and introduces our qualitative case study of
probabilistic genotyping, a software tool for analyzing DNA evidence that has
been at the center of recent controversy. Part II discusses the standard marketbased justifications for trade secret protection. It analyzes how the context of
court-ordered disclosure narrows the applicability of these concerns. It then uses
the probabilistic genotyping case study to illustrate how the distinctive features
of forensic evidence technology markets tend to extend first mover advantages,
mitigating free rider concerns. It also explains how secrecy can exacerbate
principal-agent problems in these markets, thereby skewing innovation
incentives in socially sub-optimal directions. Part III briefly considers whether
and how our analysis might change in the context of technologies that are not
developed primarily for forensic evidence use. It considers incidental evidence
19. James C. Anderson & James A. Narus, Business Marketing: Understand What Customers Value,
HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1998, at 53, 54, https://hbr.org/1998/11/business-marketing-understand-whatcustomers-value.
20. See Roth, supra note 5; Jeanna Neefe Matthews, Graham Northup, Isabella Grasso, Stephen Lorenz,
Marzieh Babaeianjelodar, Hunter Bashaw, Sumona Mondal, Abigail Matthews & Mariama Njie, When Trusted
Black Boxes Don’t Agree: Incentivizing Iterative Improvements and Accountability in Critical Software Systems,
in AIES ‘20: PROCEEDINGS OF THE AAAI/ACM CONFERENCE ON AI, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 103 (2020),
https://doi.org/10.1145/3375627.3375807.
21. See Bellovin et al., supra note 8, for a discussion of the difficulties of validating complicated software
systems. We will discuss the shortcomings of current standards of validation and admissibility in the context of
software-based evidentiary tools elsewhere.
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technologies, developed and marketed primarily for private commercial use; and
dual-purpose technologies, for which both sorts of demand are significant.
I. PROBABILISTIC GENOTYPING:
A FORENSIC EVIDENCE TECHNOLOGY CASE STUDY
Currently, controversy swirls around trade secrecy claims related to
probabilistic genotyping software for interpreting crime scene samples. The
technique is popular because it aims to extract information from samples that
cannot be analyzed with more established techniques, including those containing
complex mixtures of DNA from more than one individual.22 It has been
employed to produce evidence for criminal trials in the United States since at
least 2009 and adopted by crime labs in numerous jurisdictions. Defense
requests for disclosure of trade secret PG source code and other implementation
details have been the subject of a growing number of judicial opinions. This
robust record makes PG an excellent case study to inform and illustrate our
theoretical analysis. Subpart A of this Part compares probabilistic genotyping to
more traditional DNA analysis and explains why it depends much more heavily
on assumptions made by those who develop and use the software. Subpart B
explores the value of disclosure to defendants—and highlights the perils of
secrecy regarding source code and other implementation details. Subpart C
introduces the major players in the market for PG tools based on a review of
company websites, writings by the founders of the dominant companies and
other relevant materials. Finally, Subpart D maps the network of judicial
opinions on admissibility disclosure, demonstrating how the market appears to
be driven by a sort of “rich get richer” effect.
A. PROBABILISTIC GENOTYPING AND CRIME SCENE DNA
DNA evidence obtained from robust, single-source samples is widely
deemed the gold standard of forensic evidence and is thus highly persuasive to
courts and juries.23 This sort of DNA analysis has been used not only to obtain
convictions, but also to exonerate and free the wrongly imprisoned.24 Because
“DNA evidence” has such an excellent reputation and track record, it is
important to explain why probabilistic genotyping is different—more
complicated, more subjective, and more prone to error.
Probabilistic genotyping is used to analyze crime scene DNA samples that
are much less robust and more complex because they are mixtures of DNA from
an unknown number of individuals, contain less genetic material and may be

22. Matthews et al., supra note 8, at 322; Kwong, supra note 14, at 276.
23. See, e.g., Sarah Hammond, The DNA Factor: Lawmakers are Expanding the Use of Forensic
Technology to Battle Crime, 36 STATE LEGS. 12 (2010), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/the-dna-factor.aspx.
24. GERALD LAPORTE, NAT’L INST. JUST., WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND DNA EXONERATIONS:
UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 2 (2018), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250705.pdf.
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degraded in various ways. Genetic profiles obtained from these samples present
immense, likely insurmountable, challenges for traditional comparison by
human analysts.25 Instead, PG tools employ complicated statistical fitting
techniques that can only be implemented by computers.26 While the basic
numerical techniques employed by these tools are well-understood, their
implementation is not entirely routine. PG software enshrines various
assumptions about how to perform these fits, as well as employing parameters
that must be supplied by crime lab analysts based on their own assumptions.27
Because of these complexities, ensuring that a given tool has been properly
implemented and used in a given case is not a simple matter of ex ante validation
for a few representative samples.28 While leaving details to a technical appendix,
this Subpart provides a sketch of the PG technique and its assumptions to explain
why defendants seek disclosure and why disclosure would serve the public
interest in fair and just trials.
1. Traditional DNA Evidence
The development of traditional forensic DNA analysis was a huge
breakthrough for finding matches in situations where high quality DNA samples
with only one unknown contributor were available. The vast majority of DNA
samples collected during the early use of forensic DNA analysis were collected
in sexual assault cases29 and contained relatively high-quality DNA from only
two contributors—the victim and the perpetrator.30 In such cases, the question
for crime lab analysis was relatively simple—does the DNA profile of the
suspect match the perpetrator profile extracted from the sample? While not
devoid of contestable judgment calls, this sort of comparison was more
scientifically rigorous than many other forensic techniques and quickly became
the gold standard for both prosecution and defense.31
Forensic DNA analysis begins with using well-established laboratory
techniques to sequence the crime scene sample to obtain a DNA profile. Forensic
DNA analysis does not focus on the biologically active parts of the genome32
(that is, “genes”) that are known to “code” for proteins and to determine an
25. Kwong, supra note 14, at 300.
26. Id. at 281.
27. Matthews et al., supra note 20, at 103.
28. See Hinda Haned, Peter Gill, Kirk Lohmueller, Keith Inman & Norah Rudin, Validation of
Probabilistic Genotyping Software for Use in Forensic DNA Casework: Definitions and Illustrations, 56 SCI. &
JUST. 104, 107–08 (2016).
29. See Michael D. Coble & Jo-Anne Bright, Probabilistic Genotyping Software: An Overview,
38 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L GENETICS 219, 220 (2019).
30. Id.; T.M. Clayton, J.P. Whitaker, R. Sparkes & P. Gill, Analysis and Interpretation of Mixed Forensic
Stains Using DNA STR Profiling, 91 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 55, 64; see also Yolanda Torres, Inmaculada Flores,
Victoria Prieto, Manuel López-Soto, María José Farfán, Angel Carracedo & Pilar Sanz, DNA Mixtures in
Forensic Casework: A 4 Year Retrospective Study, 134 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 180, 181 (2003).
31. See Coble & Bright, supra note 29.
32. The genome is the complete set of genetic information in an organism. Genome, SCITABLE BY NATURE
EDUC., https://www.nature.com/scitable/definition/genome-43 (last visited Mar. 21, 2022).
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individual’s genetic traits. Instead, forensic DNA analysis involves a relatively
small number of “short tandem repeat” (“STR”) sequences, which are repeated
several times at predetermined loci in the genome.33 Forensic analysis in the
U.S. ordinarily employs up to twenty to twenty-four such loci.34
While the STR sequences used in forensic DNA analysis are not generally
of significant biological importance (they are “noncoding”), profiles based on
them are valuable because they are distinctive. The exact number of STR repeats
at a given locus varies from individual to individual,35 making it highly
statistically unlikely that two individuals’ DNA profiles will match at all of the
pre-determined locations. The profile produced by sequencing a high quality,
single source sample can thus be used as a “DNA fingerprint” for comparison
with a profile based on a sample taken from a known suspect.36
In a forensic profile output measuring the presence of various STRs, there
will be several peaks plotted against each predetermined locus used in the
analysis. Different peak patterns correspond to different genetic variants or
“alleles.”37 An individual generally has two alleles at a given locus for a coding
gene, one contributed by each parent. If those variants are the same, the person
is “homozygous” at that locus; if the variants are different, the person is
“heterozygous” at that locus.38 For the non-coding STR loci that are used in
forensic DNA analysis, each “allele” peak corresponds to a different number of
repeats of that STR. The sequencing readout from the crime scene sample can
33. A locus is a fixed position on a chromosome that contains genetic information encoding a particular
gene or genetic marker. While the location of genes and genetic markers is the same from person-to-person, the
actual genetic material encoded at each locus (that is, alleles) can be used to identify individuals. Allele,
SCITABLE BY NATURE EDUC., https://www.nature.com/scitable/definition/allele-48 (last visited Mar. 21, 2022).
34. JOHN M. BUTLER, HARI IYER, RICH PRESS, MELISSA K. TAYLOR, PETER M. VALLONE & SHEILA WILLIS,
NAT’L INST. OF STANDS. & TECH, DNA MIXTURE INTERPRETATION 21 (2012), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/
nistpubs/ir/2021/NIST.IR.8351-draft.pdf; see also JOHN BUTLER, ADVANCED TOPICS IN FORENSIC DNA
TYPING: METHODOLOGY (2012); JOHN BUTLER, ADVANCED TOPICS IN FORENSIC DNA TYPING:
INTERPRETATION (2015).
35. Stephanie Feupe Fotsing, Jonathan Margoliash, Catherine Wang, Shubham Saini, Richard Yanicky,
Sharona Shleizer-Burko, Alon Goren & Melissa Gymrek, The Impact of Short Tandem Repeat Variation on
Gene Expression, 51 NATURE GENETICS 1652, 1652 (2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41588-019-05219 (stating that STRs represent a large source of genetic variation with mutation rates that are orders of magnitude
higher than other portions of the genome and further stating that “each individual is estimated to harbor around
100 de novo mutations in STRs”).
36. See What is a DNA Fingerprint?, YOURGENOME (July 21, 2021) https://www.yourgenome.org/facts/
what-is-a-dna-fingerprint.
37. Karen Norrgard, Forensics, DNA Fingerprinting, and CODIS, SCITABLE BY NATURE EDUC.,
https://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/forensics-dna-fingerprinting-and-codis-736 (last visited Mar. 21,
2022) (“For instance, the STR known as D7S820, found on chromosome 7, contains between 5 and 16 repeats
of GATA. Therefore, there are 12 different alleles possible for the D7S820 STR. An individual with D7S820
alleles 10 and 15, for example, would have inherited a copy of D7S820 with 10 GATA repeats from one parent,
and a copy of D7S820 with 15 GATA repeats from his or her other parent.”). In coding regions of DNA, an
allele generally refers to a version of the gene, not the number of copies of a repeat present. In the case of a noncoding region like an STR, an allele generally refers to the number of repeats present, since that, technically,
represents the possible “versions” of that segment of DNA (or locus) in the population.
38. Allele, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST., https://www.genome.gov/genetics-glossary/Allele
(last
visited Mar. 21, 2022).
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then be compared to the sequencing readout of the suspect’s DNA, resulting in
a final determination about whether the suspect was involved in or present at the
potentially criminal act.
2. Complex Crime Scene Samples and Probabilistic Genotyping
In many circumstances, crime scene DNA samples are not amenable to the
gold standard analysis described above because they are contaminated, degraded
or simply too small to produce highly accurate sequencing results.39 These
problems reduce the certainty of DNA matching even for single-source samples.
Real crime scene samples may also contain DNA from more than one, and often
an unknown number of, individuals. Laboratory analysis, however, gives only
one combined profile, which is an entangled superposition of profiles from all
of these DNA contributors. Sequencing alone cannot ascertain who contributed
the DNA, how many people contributed to the mixture, or what the possible
individual genetic profiles are. These sources of uncertainty often compound one
another in real crime scene samples.
Probabilistic genotyping software uses sophisticated computational
techniques to try to estimate how likely it is that a particular suspect’s DNA is
included in such a mixed, potentially degraded crime scene sample. The output
of probabilistic genotyping software programs is reported in the form of a
likelihood ratio (“LR”), which expresses the relative probability that the
observed sequencing results reflect a scenario including the suspect, compared
to the likelihood that a randomly chosen individual was at the scene.40 The
computational approach uses a statistical technique to generate many possible
origin stories for the observed profile and assign each a relative probability based
on how well it fits the available data and how plausible it is in light of what is
known or presumed about population genetics.41 PG algorithms thus are based
on biological modeling; human, molecular, and population genetics; statistical
analysis techniques; and computer science.42 PG analysis is controversial
because it depends much more heavily than traditional DNA analysis, and less
straightforwardly, on various assumptions made by programmers and crime lab
analysts.43

39. In addition, the analysis may have to account for drop-out (when an allele is missing from the
sequencing data because it was not present or because it was present in too low levels to be detected by the
sequencing apparatus) and stutter (an artifact of DNA sequencing that can result in inaccurate reads). See Moss,
supra note 14, at 1034, as well as the Appendix below.
40. See John S. Buckleton, Jo-Anne Bright, Simone Gittelson, Tamyra R. Moretti, Anthony J. Onorato,
Frederick R. Bieber, Bruce Budowle & Duncan A. Taylor, The Probabilistic Genotyping Software STRmix:
Utility and Evidence for its Validity, 64 J. FORENSIC SCI. 393, 394 (2019). It is important to note that a likelihood
ratio expresses the ratio of two mutually exclusive events. That is, the POI either is, or is not, a contributor to
the mixture. Id.
41. See THERMOFISHER SCI., PROBABILISTIC GENOTYPING (2018), https://assets.thermofisher.com/TFSAssets/LSG/Flyers/prob-geno-hps-flyer.pdf; See Coble & Bright, supra note 29, at 219.
42. See THERMOFISHER SCI., supra note 41.
43. See Coble & Bright, supra note 29, at 223.
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A simplified example illustrates some of the ways that such assumptions
can affect the analysis. Assume we use a simplified DNA profile based on only
one locus (instead of the usual twenty to twenty-four) and that there are three
possible alleles at that locus, which we will call A, B, and C. The DNA profile
from a crime scene sample might then contain two peaks of height x at positions
A and B and one of height 2x at position C. (See Figure 1.) To use one of the
available PG tools to interpret this data, the forensic analyst must input an
assumption about the number of contributors.44 Experienced technicians can
make educated guesses by eyeballing the DNA sequencing data, but for full
DNA profiles of real crime scene samples the determination is anything but
certain. For our over-simplified example, suppose our forensic analyst assumes
that the sample contains equal amounts of DNA from two contributors. Assume
also that all alleles of all contributors are present and detected in the mixture. (In
practice, it is possible that not all alleles of all contributors are present in the
mixture or that one or more go undetected by sequencing technologies.)45
Essentially, we assume that the profiles from scenario (AC, BC) and scenario
(AB, CC) (and only those profiles) fit the data perfectly. The analysis thus
eliminates scenarios involving people with genotypes other than AC, BC, AB
and CC. Even with these prosecution-friendly assumptions and our toy onelocus profile, there are two scenarios that could have produced the sequencing
graph shown in Figure 1. First, the sample could contain DNA from one
contributor with genotype AC and one with genotype BC at this locus. Such a
mixture would produce the observed profile with peak of height x at A and B
and height 2x at C. Alternatively, the sample could contain DNA from
contributors with genotypes AB and CC, which would produce exactly the same
readout. Unless we have further information, we must assume that genotypes
AC, BC, AB and CC are equally likely to be found in the “reference population”
of people who might have visited the crime scene, so that the scenarios (AC,
BC) and (AB, CC) are equally likely to explain the DNA data.

44. Catherine McGovern, Kevin Cheng, Hannah Kelly, Anna Cieck, Duncan Taylor, John S. Buckleton &
Jo-Anne Bright, Performance of a Method for Weighting a Range in the Number of Contributors in
Probabilistic Genotyping, 48 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L GENETICS 102352 (2020); see also Coble & Bright, supra
note 29, at 220.
45. This is referred to as “allele dropout.” See What is a DNA Fingerprint?, supra note 36. For example,
assume the readout illustrated in the text (i.e., A = height x; B = height x; C = height 2x). It is also theoretically
possible that there were three (or even more) contributors present, but that, due to sample quality or amount, one
or more alleles went undetected during sequencing. Assume three contributors present at the crime scene and
the presence of an A allele and B allele that went undetected in the mixture. With perfect knowledge, we would
know that the sequencing should have detected heights of 2x at each position A, B, and C. As a result, the real
contributor profile could be AA, BB, CC; AA, BC, BC; AB, AB, CC; AC, AC, BB; AB, AC, BC; etc. Each of
these differs meaningfully from the AC, BC or AB, CC predictions based on the readout presented in the text.
When the possibility of allele dropout is added to even this simple example, the number of potential contributor
profiles and their potential complexity expands rapidly. A realistic probabilistic genotyping algorithm must
account for the likelihood of allele dropout in light of the quality of the input data. (See Figure 1.)
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FIGURE 1: ILLUSTRATION OF HYPOTHETICAL SAMPLE
Figure 1. This figure illustrates the hypothetical example posed in Part II.A.

In our simplified example that assumes two contributors to a complex
mixture of DNA, this profile could represent one contributor with the
genotype AC and one contributor with the genotype BC, or alternatively, it
could represent one contributor with the genotype AB and one contributor
with the genotype CC. A, B, and C represent three possible alleles found at a
single locus. The values x and 2x represent the relative amount of DNA
found in the hypothetical sample assumed in the example.

Now suppose we have a suspect with genotype AC. Because there is a
50:50 chance that the (AC, BC) scenario is correct, there is a 50% chance that
someone with genotype AC was at the crime scene. What is the probability that
our suspect was that someone? In the best-case scenario for the prosecution,
there might be reason to believe that there is only one individual in the reference
population with genotype AC. In that case, the probability that our suspect’s
DNA is in the sample would be 50%. Otherwise, if there are NAC individuals
with genotype AC in the reference population, the probability that our suspect’s
DNA is in the sample is lower (50% divided by NAC).
Rather than reporting this sort of straightforward probability estimate, PG
tools generally output a “likelihood ratio.”46 The likelihood ratio divides the PG
estimate of the probability that the suspect’s DNA was in the crime scene DNA
sample by the analyst’s estimate of that probability before seeing the crime scene
sequence data.47 Before seeing the crime scene profile in Figure 1, the analyst
in our example can only guess that our suspect’s DNA is in the crime scene
sample with probability 1/N, where N is the size of the reference population.
Thus, the likelihood ratio multiplies the probability that the suspect’s DNA is in
the crime scene sample by the size of the reference population.

46. See Appendix.
47. Mark W. Perlin, Explaining the Likelihood Ratio in DNA Mixture Interpretation, in THE PROCEEDINGS
OF PROMEGA’S TWENTY FIRST INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON HUMAN IDENTIFICATION
6 (2010),
https://www.promega.ee/~/media/files/resources/conference%20proceedings/ishi%2021/oral%20presentations/
perlin.pdf.
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Reported Likelihood Ratios are often much, much larger than the odds that
the suspect’s DNA is in the sample because they assume a large reference
population. Thus, in a situation similar to our hypothetical, in which the analysis
revealed two equally plausible scenarios, a standard calculation might put the
odds that the suspect was at the crime scene at 1 out of 300 million before the
DNA analysis and somewhere around 50% after the analysis, giving a likelihood
ratio of about 150 million.
The likelihood ratio approach to expressing the results of DNA analysis
can thus be highly misleading because it measures the wrong thing from an
evidentiary perspective.48 The relevant question is not how much the DNA
analysis has reduced the number of plausible scenarios, but how many plausible
scenarios are left after the analysis. In our toy hypothetical, the DNA analysis
leaves us with two equally plausible scenarios, one of which excludes the
suspect. No matter how large the likelihood ratio, the suspect should not be
convicted unless there is evidence that rules out the alternative scenario. The
example also shows how sensitive the likelihood ratio is to assumptions about
the reference population. The larger the reference population, the larger the
likelihood ratio, even if the reference population includes scenarios that are
highly implausible in the context of the particular crime.
The hypothetical in Figure 1 is illustrative, but unrealistic. In reality, the
sequencing result from a crime scene sample will contain several peaks at up to
twenty to twenty-four loci,49 may represent more than two contributors, and may
be compromised by sample quality or other artifacts. As a result, rather than two
possible scenarios that fit the crime scene sample sequencing data perfectly,
there are likely to be many alternative scenarios that fit the data reasonably well.
PG tackles this problem using a computational approach called Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC),50 which essentially imagines an enormous number of
possible scenarios and estimates their likelihood in light of how well they fit the
data and how prevalent similar profiles are in the population. The likelihood
ratios calculated by PG tools are highly dependent on assumptions made by both
the analyst in the particular case and the creator of the program about how many
individuals are represented in the sample, how the comparison population of
unknown persons is composed and the quality of the sample. These calculations

48. See Stiffelman, supra note 14 (providing an extensive critique of the evidentiary use of the likelihood
ratio).
49. BUTLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 21.
50. There are two forms of MCMC analysis used in PG software technologies: semi-continuous and fullycontinuous. In fully continuous MCMC, the approach used in the most prevalent PG tools, including those
discussed later in this paper (STRmix and TrueAllele), the analysis factors the allele peak height and other
biological parameters into the calculations, whereas semi-continuous methods do not. Buckleton et al., supra
note 40, at 394. Both methods are based on estimating the probability of observing the complex DNA profile.
Semi-continuous MCMC methods also use a different nuisance parameter (allele dropout). There are perceived
benefits to fully continuous MCMC methods for PG because they more effectively use all of the collected data
and do not “waste” data that has been collected and reported as part of the sequencing.
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may also be affected by the settings chosen for various parameters and
thresholds in the software.51
B. THE PERILS OF ALLOWING TRADE SECRECY TO IMPEDE DISCLOSURE OF
FORENSIC SOFTWARE
Though, as we shall see, courts have largely accepted evidence produced
by probabilistic genotyping, there is ongoing disagreement about its reliability,
especially for more complex mixtures.52 In September 2016, the President’s
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) issued a report about
validating forensic methods. The report gave probabilistic genotyping mixed
reviews. It concluded that “evidence supports the foundational validity of
analysis, with some programs, of DNA mixtures of three individuals in which
the minor contributor constitutes at least 20 percent of the intact DNA in the
mixture and in which the DNA amount exceeds the minimum required level for
the method.”53 The two dominant PG companies, STRmix and TrueAllele,
strongly disputed these limitations. STRmix asserted that it had “demonstrate[d]
the foundational validity of STRmix™ for complex, mixed DNA profiles to
levels well beyond the complexity and contribution levels suggested by
PCAST,”54 while TrueAllele’s founder argued that PCAST was attempting to
impose “arbitrary limits (e.g., number of contributors) on a scientifically
validated solution.”55 In late 2019, the United States Government Accountability
Office (“GAO”), Science Technology Assessment, and Analytics, affirmed that
PG technology “is not yet fully mature.”56 Some problems the GAO highlighted
include the lack of consistency (even when using the same software package)
and the lack of outside validation.57
Questions highlighting the uncertain validity of probabilistic genotyping
software have continued to persist. The National Institutes of Standards and
51. A future article from the authors will more fully explore the challenges of validating software-based
forensic tools, and, in particular, validating the software used in probabilistic genotyping. That article will focus
on two central sets of validation challenges—first, those related to source code validation and second, those
related to laboratory-specific implementation and validation. Many probabilistic genotyping validation efforts
have primarily focused on lab-specific validation, but we argue that source code validation is also essential to
ensuring accurate and valid software performance and results. See also Bellovin, supra note 8 (discussing the
importance and challenges of effective validation of software reliability).
52. Coble & Bright, supra note 29, at 222; Buckleton et al., supra note 40, at 397.
53. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ADVISORS SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: FORENSIC SCIENCE IN
CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 82 (2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_repor
t_final.pdf.
54. Update on STRmix Research in Response to PCAST, STRMIX (Aug. 18, 2017),
https://www.strmix.com/news/update-on-strmix-research-in-response-to-pcast/?acceptCookies=
6188d2cdf3a68.
55. Letter from Mark W. Perlin, Cybergenetics Chief Sci. to Dr. John Holdren, PCAST co-chair at 2 (Sept.
16, 2016), https://www.cybgen.com/information/newsroom/2016/sep/files/letter.pdf.
56. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-306T, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: OVERVIEW OF
GAO’S ENHANCED CAPABILITIES TO PROVIDE OVERSIGHT, INSIGHT, AND FORESIGHT 25 (2019).
57. Id.
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Technology (“NIST”), a non-regulatory research agency within the United
States Department of Commerce, released a draft report in June 2021 reemphasizing that further information and research are needed to determine the
reliability of probabilistic genotyping software.58 In response, a group of
criminal defense attorneys associated with groups including the Legal Society
of New York and the Bronx Defenders, called on NIST to impose a moratorium
on the use of probabilistic genotyping software until a set of five requirements
were met. The requirements focus on having laboratories and developers provide
sufficient data for NIST to complete an independent assessment of the reliability
of the software and for laboratories to demonstrate that their analysts are
proficient dealing with various types of DNA mixtures. The letter also calls for
a racial impact assessment to determine how the current use of the software has
impacted historically oppressed groups.59
PG-based likelihood ratios have the potential to make strong impressions
on jurors and judges and are dependent on a number of assumptions.60 It is thus
essential that defendants be given the information they need to probe whether
those likelihood ratios are produced in a manner that is trustworthy, accurate,
and statistically sound. Indeed, it is clear that assumptions made in implementing
and using PG software can affect the results. The PG tools produced by STRmix
and TrueAllele have been known to produce significantly different values for
the likelihood ratio of the same sample and their founders have sparred publicly
about the differences.61
Prosecutors and PG companies have routinely opposed defense requests
for disclosure of PG source code, asserting that the reliability of these tools can
be validated without source code disclosure.62 In future work, we will analyze
the ways in which current evidence doctrine and its judicial implementation fail
to demand meaningful validation of probabilistic genotyping in particular, and
software-based probabilistic forensic technologies more generally. For present

58. BUTLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 89; see also Matthews et al., supra note 20 (reporting an empirical
study of the effects of variations in PG software implementation).
59. Criminal Defense Letter from the Legal Aid Society to Nat’l Inst. Standards & Tech. (Aug. 23, 2021).
60. Coble & Bright, supra note 29, at 222.
61. See Decision and Order, New York v. Hillary (Hon. Felix Catena, J.) (St. Lawrence Co., Aug. 26, 2016)
(excluding STRmix evidence, and explaining that the New York State Police Crime Lab first sent data to
Cybergenetics and then, when the results came back inconclusive, sent the data to ESR); see also Open Letter
from Mark Perlin, Misrepresentation of DNA evidence in People of New York v. Oral (Nick) Hillary (July 29,
2016) (on file with authors) (criticizing the methodology of John Buckleton and ESR in interpreting the data in
this case); Jesse McKinley, Judge Rejects DNA Test in Trial Over Garrett Phillips’s Murder, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/27/nyregion/judge-rejects-dna-test-in-trial-over-garrett-phillipssmurder.html; Stephanie M. Lee, People are Going to Prison Over DNA Software—But How It Works is Secret,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/stephaniemlee/dna-software-code
(“Differing ratios may not always change jurors’ minds, like when one method claims a 1 in 5 million chance of
being wrong and another claims 1 in 81 billion (as was the case with a rapist in Pennsylvania). But errors in how
these ratios are calculated can really matter when two methods end up with wildly different results, like 1 in 420
versus 1 in 18 billion (as was the case in a fatal 2008 shooting.”)).
62. See generally infra Part III.D.4.
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purposes, we demonstrate the value of source code disclosure with a cautionary
tale involving the Forensic Statistical Tool, or “FST,” a probabilistic genotyping
tool developed in house by the New York Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
(“OCME”).63 Two early cases diverged as to the admissibility of FST evidence:
it was admitted in People v. Rodriguez and rejected in People v. Collins. The
Collins decision quickly proved to be an outlier, however, as FST evidence was
admitted in other cases throughout New York City,64 with courts relying
explicitly on “the testimony and findings in Rodriguez as settling the questions
posed by the defendant”65 and finding it “not necessary [] to duplicate those
efforts.”66
As things turned out, a duplication of those efforts might have proved
worthwhile. In late 2016, Judge Valerie Caproni of the Southern District of New
York ordered FST’s source code disclosed to a defendant’s experts under a
protective order.67 The OCME moved to quash, arguing that its “property rights
should be respected.”68 Judge Caproni was not persuaded, however, and the FST
source code was released to the defense. After defense expert Nate Adams
reviewed the source code, journalists from ProPublica intervened, successfully
moving to vacate the protective order.69 The ProPublica investigation that
ensued revealed that, after completing its full validation of FST and bringing it
online in New York City labs, the OCME “recoded” portions of the tool to deal
with problems encountered in real-world applications and “did not inform the
state oversight commission about the change, nor did they run another full
validation study on the program.”70 The investigation also uncovered substantial
substantive weaknesses in the tool, including that “FST’s inventors had
acknowledged a margin of error of 30 percent for one key input of the program,
and that the program could not take into consideration that family members
might share DNA.”71
The story of FST illustrates two important points. The first is that fieldwork
invariably presents cases outside the scope of a tool’s initial validation. The ill-

63. CRAIG O’CONNOR, N.Y. OFF. OF THE CHIEF EXAM’R, PROBABILISTIC GENOTYPING: THE USE OF THE
FORENSIC STATISTICAL TOOL (FST) (2014), https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/forensics/
CraigOConnor_DNA-2.pdf (stating that “OCME developed and validated FST.”).
64. See, e.g., People v. Carter, No. 2573/14, 2016 WL 239708 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 12, 2016).
65. People v. Lopez, 23 N.Y.S.3d 820, 825 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
66. Carter, 2016 WL 239708, at *3.
67. Order at 1, United States v. Kevin Johnson, No. 15-CR-565 (VEC) (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2016) (Notably,
Judge Caproni added that “[t]he Court is prepared to enter a protective order if OCME wishes, although the
Court questions why a public laboratory would need a protective order in this context”).
68. Letter from Florence Hunter, General Counsel, Office of the Chief Medical Examiner to Judge Valerie
E. Caproni (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2016) (on file with authors).
69. Lauren Kirchner, Federal Judge Unseals New York Crime Lab’s Software for Analyzing DNA
Evidence, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/federal-judge-unseals-new-yorkcrime-labs-software-for-analyzing-dna-evidence.
70. Id.
71. Lauren Kirchner, New York City Moves to Create Accountability for Algorithms, PROPUBLICA (Dec.
18, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/new-york-city-moves-to-create-accountability-for-algorithms.
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fated, and untested, modification to the FST software was made to paper over
the tool’s inability to correctly handle just such a case. Because courts were
willing to admit FST evidence and deny disclosure based on the original
validation studies, while relying on its admission in earlier cases, there was no
path for uncovering later-arising problems with the validity of the tool.
Unfortunately, just such later-arising problems are endemic to complicated
software.72
Second, the FST story illustrates how secrecy can mask problematic
behavior, limitations, and mistakes that are unlikely to be detected by validation
studies or black box testing. Validation can be gamed, or simply incomplete, and
once a flawed product is on the market and protected by trade secrecy, its
developers have incentives to turn a blind eye to, or even cover up, its flaws.
Disclosing source code disincentivizes intentional cover-ups and allows defense
experts not only to contest explicit and implicit assumptions, but also to expose
unwitting mistakes and careless errors.73 Anticipating disclosure, developers
would have much stronger incentives to ferret out, investigate, and correct
limitations and errors revealed through applications of their tools in the field.
C. THE PROBABILISTIC GENOTYPING MARKET
Software employing some form of probabilistic genotyping methods has
been around for approximately two decades. Today, there are two dominant
probabilistic genotyping tools used to produce forensic evidence. TrueAllele,
the first of these two to appear on the market, was developed by Dr. Mark Perlin,
who founded Cybergenetics in 1994. Cybergenetics initially focused on medical
applications of DNA studies, but switched to forensic DNA work in 199974 and
developed its continuous MCMC PG tool, TrueAllele, in the early 2000s.
According to the Cybergenetics website, TrueAllele technology was first
adopted for analysis of crime scene evidence in 2004 by the British Forensic
Science Service.75 In 2006, Cybergenetics was awarded a contract to use
TrueAllele software to help identify victims of the World Trade Center attack.76
Three years later, in 2009, evidence obtained using TrueAllele was first admitted

72. Bellovin, supra note 8, at 39.
73. See id. at 31–35 (describing the importance of adversarial testing for software reliability).
74. History, CYBERGENETICS, https://www.cybgen.com/company/history.shtml (last visited Mar. 21,
2022).
75. Press Release, Cybergenetics, Cybergenetics Accelerates the UK National DNA Database (July 11,
2001), https://www.cybgen.com/information/press-release/2001/Cybergenetics-Accelerates-the-UK-NationalDNA-Database/page.shtml.
76. Cybergenetics Awarded Contract to Identify World Trade Center Victim Remains Using TrueAllele
Technology, CYBERGENETICS (Sept. 8, 2006), https://www.cybgen.com/information/press-release/2006/
Cybergenetics-Awarded-Contract-to-Identify-World-Trade-Center-Victim-Remains-Using-TrueAlleleTechnology/page.shtml.
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in the U.S. in a Pennsylvania case.77 The Cybergenetics website reports uses of
TrueAllele in about fifteen cases per year since 2015.78
Development of STRmix began in 2010, as a joint project of two
government-funded laboratories: Forensic Science South Australia (FSSA) and
the forensic arm of New Zealand’s Institute of Environmental Science and
Research (ESR). The program was first used for casework in Australia and New
Zealand in 2012. Dr. John Buckleton, the senior member of the STRmix team,
is a consummate forensic science insider, whose “caseworking experience
covers 33 years in the United States, Australia, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom and New Zealand.”79 STRmix evidence was first accepted by a U.S.
court in 2015 and, according to Buckleton’s blog, has been the subject of at least
17 admissibility hearings in North America.80
Crime labs in a given state (when there is more than one) all tend to adopt
the same tool. Currently, the PG market in the United States is divided almost
exclusively between states that primarily use TrueAllele and states that primarily
use STRmix. States that began using TrueAllele before STRmix entered the
market tend to have stuck with it (at least so far), while STRmix has become the
favorite of later adopters, which are now in the majority. As discussed in Subpart
B, New York used the state-developed “FST” for several years. When that tool
was discredited after its source code was disclosed, New York laboratories
adopted STRmix. Strikingly, while several open-source versions of PG software
are available, only one state (Colorado) has employed an open source PG tool
(Lab Retriever) to any considerable degree, and it has more recently adopted
STRmix as well.
The developers of TrueAllele, STRmix, and FST have all argued on
numerous occasions, in response to defense requests, that their source code and
other implementation details constitute trade secrets.81 Courts have routinely
endorsed these arguments, denying defense requests for disclosure on that basis.
While STRmix has repeatedly resisted court-ordered production of source code,
it does allow defense experts to gain sharply limited access to the JavaScript
code, governed by a confidentiality agreement and carried out under restrictive
conditions.82
Because crime labs purchase or license these tools for the purpose of
producing admissible evidence, one way to follow the growth of the market is
77. Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
78. Cases Where Cybergenetics Testified About TrueAllele® Evidence, CYBERGENETICS,
https://www.cybgen.com/news/trials.shtml (last visited Mar. 21, 2022).
79. John Buckleton, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.com/authors/John-Buckleton.html (last visited
Mar. 21, 2022).
80. John Buckleton, STRmix, WORDPRESS, https://johnbuckleton.wordpress.com/strmix (last visited Mar.
21, 2022).
81. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court (Chubbs), No. B258569, 2015 WL 139069, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan.
9, 2015); People v. Wakefield, 9 N.Y.S.3d 540, 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
82. STRMIX, ACCESS TO STRMIX™ SOFTWARE BY DEFENCE LEGAL TEAMS (2016),
https://www.strmix.com/assets/Uploads/Defence-Access-to-STRmix-April-2016.pdf.
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by tracing references in judicial opinions and orders. These opinions usually
address defense requests for disclosure of the source code and other
implementation details in the context of admissibility determinations and/or
assertions of a trade secret privilege.83 We have collected representative
opinions and orders through searching Lexis, Westlaw, and other online sources
based on suggestions from defense attorneys active in this area. We include
opinions addressing both admissibility and trade secret privilege because they
address similar disclosure-related questions and also because courts often cite
rulings of one sort in their decisions about the other.84 In the vast majority of
such cases, with a few recent exceptions, courts have upheld trade secrecy and
denied disclosure to defense experts.85 As we discuss in further detail in Part III,
judges considering these issues frequently rely heavily (or even exclusively) on
previous decisions, often from outside jurisdictions.86 These references create a
network that tracks adoption and is also generally representative of the evolution
of the market. Figures 2 and 3 show that network for cases up through 2021.

83. See generally infra Part III.D.4.
84. We believe we have been reasonably thorough, but cannot guarantee that our collection is
comprehensive. While many of the court orders discussed in this Article are unreported and accessible only
through tools such as PACER or by request to local courts, PDF copies of the orders cited here are on file with
the authors unless otherwise noted.
85. See infra Part III.
86. See infra Part III.
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FIGURE 2: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF OBSERVED NETWORK EFFECT

Figure 2. This figure shows the geographic distribution of the observed
network effect. Cases are superimposed on the originating jurisdiction.
Connecting edges illustrate the citing relationship between the cases. Blash is
plotted off of the continental United States, as it is a United States Virgin
Islands Superior Court decision. Foley refers to the 2012 decision, and Foley
(2) refers to the 2009 decision. The case names are color-coded relative to the
PG algorithm. Black: TrueAllele; Maroon: STRMix; Blue: FST. The network
was created using Cytoscape version 3.9.1. 87

87. In addition to the cases cited in this article, Figure 2 also includes United States v. Gissantaner, 990
F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2021); State v. Bah, No.17CR00938 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 2019); State v. Battle, No.
A17A1753 (Ga. App. Ct. May 31, 2017); and Order, State v. Sewell, No. 17CR01675 (Ga. Super. Ct. Aug. 7,
2019).
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FIGURE 3: INTERACTION NETWORK OF CITING AND CITED CASES

Figure 3. This figure illustrates the interaction network of citing and cited
cases and illustrates the observed network effect. The nodes (corresponding
to cases) are scaled according to the number of times the case was cited
relative to the other cases in the interaction network. Connecting edges
illustrate the citing relationship between the cases. Foley refers to the 2012
decision, and Foley (2) refers to the 2009 decision. The network was created
using Cytoscape version 3.9.1.88

II. TRADE SECRECY, INNOVATION AND MARKETS FOR
FORENSIC EVIDENCE TECHNOLOGY
There are two primary justifications for legal trade secrecy protection, each
premised on avoiding a different sort of market failure.89 First, like other forms
of intellectual property protection, trade secrecy law is justified partly as a
mechanism for promoting innovation.90 Under this rationale, trade secrecy
preserves innovation incentives by providing a period of market exclusivity
during which an innovator can recoup R&D investments without fear of
88. In addition to the cases cited in this article, Figure 3 also includes Gissantaner, 990 F.3d 457; Bah, No.
17CR00938; Battle, No. A17A1753; Order, Sewell, No. 17CR01675.
89. Government secrecy regarding certain investigatory techniques and procedures is also sometimes
justified by fears of “gaming the system.” See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E) (2016). One of us has critiqued the
scope of such assertions elsewhere. See Ignacio Cofone & Katherine J. Strandburg, Strategic Games and
Algorithmic Secrecy, 64 MCGILL L.J. 623, 627 (2019). In any event, this argument is distinct from, and of
entirely different legal and analytical scope than, the trade secrecy privilege assertions at issue here.
90. See Robert G. Bone, Trade Secrecy, Innovation and the Requirement of Reasonable Secrecy
Precautions, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 46,
64 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011); Serge Pajak, Do Innovative Firms Rely on Big
Secrets? An Analysis of IP Protection Strategies with the CIS 4 Survey, 25 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW
TECH. 516, 528 (2016); Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1,
26 (2007) (explaining that promoting innovation is a minor, but extant, justification for trade secrecy).
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competition from free riding copyists. In fact, the period of market exclusivity,
and the corresponding market advantage, extends as long as the trade secret is
kept secret.91
Second, and unlike other forms of intellectual property, trade secrecy has
another primary goal of regulating market behavior by punishing and deterring
unethical mechanisms for obtaining information from competitors, thereby also
avoiding (or at least diminishing) wasteful investments in an economic
espionage arms race.92 This distinctive mission emerges because trade secrets
are largely a matter of self-help.93 Commercial actors can, and do, use a whole
range of practical mechanisms, as well as contractual non-disclosure
agreements, to control access to and disclosure of economically valuable secrets.
Trade secret law merely provides back-up protection to these other measures.
By contrast, the scope of copyright and patent protections is under legislative
control and, though doctrinal controversies abound, there is widespread
agreement that the goal is to balance between the innovation incentives created
by market exclusivity and the offsetting social costs borne by consumers and
follow-on innovators.94 Because of its dual mission and back-up stance, trade
secrecy doctrine cannot even attempt such a nuanced balancing act.
This Part argues that trade secret privileges for forensic evidence
technology are largely unjustified by the traditional rationales for trade secrecy
law because court-ordered disclosure departs from the ordinary context of trade
secrecy law in two highly significant ways. First, trade secrecy law’s role in
regulating undesirable market behavior is irrelevant to court-ordered disclosure.
Second, the distinctive characteristics of forensic evidence technology markets
largely undercut the need for trade secrecy to preserve incentives for innovation
against free-riding competitors.

91. See Bone, supra note 90, at 73; David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our
Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 145 (2007); U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, How Long Does Patent,
Trademark or Copyright Protection Last?, STOPFAKES.GOV (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.stopfakes.gov/
article?id=How-Long-Does-Patent-Trademark-or-Copyright-Protection-Last.
92. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1939) (“[T]he liability rests
upon . . . breach of contract, and abuse of confidence or impropriety in the method of ascertaining the secret.”).
93. See Bone, supra note 90, at 46 (explaining how the Uniform Trade Secrets Act makes taking reasonable
precautions to maintain secrecy an essential element in an enforceable trade secret.).
94. See, e.g., Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (“The Patent Clause itself
reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle
competition without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ As we have noted in
the past, the Clause contains both a grant of power and certain limitations upon the exercise of that power.”);
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The limited scope of the copyright holder’s
statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of
competing claims upon the public interest . . . The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return
for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good.”).
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A. LEGAL TRADE SECRECY PROTECTION’S SCOPE AND PURPOSES
Trade secret protection is a longstanding feature of state (and colonial) law
and, since Congress enacted the Defend Trade Secrets Act in 2016, has also
found a place in the U.S. Code.95 While definitions vary somewhat, trade secrecy
laws generally protect a wide variety of commercial information as long as it (1)
is actually secret, in that it is not generally known or readily ascertainable to
others who can obtain economic value from it, (2) is more valuable because it is
secret, and (3) is protected by reasonable secrecy preservation measures.96
Significantly for present purposes, trade secrecy laws proscribe only
“misappropriation,” defined to include acquisition by “improper means” and
culpable downstream uses and disclosures. The misappropriation requirement,
along with the requirement of actual secrecy, distinguish trade secrecy from
copyright, which proscribes all unauthorized copying, regardless of means or
intent, and patent, which penalizes even independent invention.97 “Improper
means” generally include typical forms of economic espionage and theft, as well
as violations of employment policies and non-disclosure agreements. Reverse
engineering and independent invention, however, are legitimate means for
obtaining previously secret information.98 These mechanisms are consistent
with trade secrecy law’s focus on misappropriation and are viewed as crucial
limitations on trade secrecy’s downstream social costs. They are, however, crude
mechanisms for tailoring the scope of protection when compared with the
detailed scope tailoring and defenses embodied in copyright and patent law.
B. MISAPPROPRIATION AND COURT-ORDERED DISCLOSURE
Trade secret law’s misappropriation element sets it apart from other
intellectual property liability regimes, which generally do not turn on
defendants’ wrongful behavior. The misappropriation requirement recognizes
that secrecy is first and foremost a practical tool for market actors, which does
not depend on a legal entitlement. The rationale for legal protection against
misappropriation was expressed at length by the Supreme Court in its 1974
opinion Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., which held that state trade secrecy
law was not preempted by federal patent law:
[Abolishing trade secret protection] would [lead to] an increase in the amount
of self-help that innovative companies would employ. Knowledge would be
widely dispersed among the employees of those still active in research.
Security precautions necessarily would be increased . . . . Smaller companies
95. Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836–1839 (2016).
96. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1.4 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985).
97. See, e.g., Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion in Patent Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643, 1657–
74 (2010) (critiquing patent on this ground). Copyright and, to a lesser extent patent, laws do have important
scope limitations and exceptions, but both are essentially strict liability and do not invoke conceptions of
improper means.
98. See Jonathan R. Chally, The Law of Trade Secrets: Toward A More Efficient Approach, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 1269, 1284–86 (2004).
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would be placed at a distinct economic disadvantage, since the costs of this
kind of self-help could be great, and the cost to the public of the use of this
invention would be increased.
...
Nothing in the patent law requires that States refrain from action to prevent
industrial espionage. In addition to the increased costs for protection from
burglary, wiretapping, bribery, and the other means used to misappropriate
trade secrets, there is the inevitable cost to the basic decency of society when
one firm steals from another.99

The misappropriation justification is, however, irrelevant to court-ordered
disclosure, which obviously does not involve “misappropriation”100 and will not
provoke wasteful investments in an economic espionage arms race. If anything,
concerns about wasteful investment cut the other way in this context; the
availability of trade secrecy defenses to disclosure leads to litigation over their
applicability, with its attendant transaction costs.
Moreover, trade secrecy protection is routinely limited by disclosure
mandates in a wide variety of regulatory contexts. Some such regulations
mandate public disclosure, often for the purpose of informing consumer
purchasing decisions.101 Many other regulations mandate disclosure to
government regulatory bodies. For the most part, these disclosure mandates are
motivated by concerns about market failure due to information asymmetries
between suppliers and consumers. Court-ordered disclosures of the workings of
forensic evidence technology may have loftier goals related to the legitimacy of
the justice system, but they also can prevent similar forms of demand-side
market failure, as discussed in Subpart E.102
Because the misappropriation justification is inapposite, any justification
for trade secret privileges for forensic evidence technology must turn on whether
they promote socially valuable innovation. Indeed, judges denying defense
requests for disclosures about probabilistic genotyping tools clearly rely on this
assumption. Thus, the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s seminal decision in Foley
relies on the assumption that “TrueAllele is proprietary software; it would not
be possible to market TrueAllele if it were available for free.”103 Similar

99. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485–87 (1974).
100. Trade secret law’s definitions do, however, govern the scope of information for which trade secret
privileges are potentially available. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1061(a) (setting the definition of “trade secret”
for purposes of evidentiary privilege equal to the standard definition in Cal. Civil Code § 3426.1(d)).
Nonetheless, in practice, cases involving trade secret privileges for black box evidence devote surprisingly little
attention to determining which information about the technology actually qualifies as trade secret.
101. Laws requiring disclosure of ingredients in food, drugs and cosmetics are of this nature. See, e.g., 21
U.S.C. §§ 321–92 (requiring labeling of cosmetic ingredients); 21 U.S.C. § 343 (explaining definition of
misbranded food); see also N.Y. ENV’T CONSERV. LAW § 35-0107 (McKinney 1972) (requiring disclosure of
ingredients in household cleaning products).
102. See infra Part III.E.
103. Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 889 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
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sentiments are echoed in many other opinions dealing with TrueAllele, STRmix,
and even the state-owned FST.104
C. COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADE SECRETS, OH MY!
Copyrights and patents are expected to serve their constitutional purpose
of “promot[ing] the progress of science and useful arts,”105 by providing a
limited period of market exclusivity. Their rationale posits that, in the absence
of intellectual property protection, competitors can cheaply copy technological
inventions or creative works.106 Because free riding competitors do not have to
make their own R&D or creative investments, they can charge low prices that
undercut innovators’ ability to recoup such investments. Anticipating
competition from free riders, potential authors and inventors will presumably be
deterred from investing, and creating, in the first place.107 This situation
produces a market failure if consumers would have been willing to pay the
higher prices necessary to cover the R&D costs. Patent law also aims to promote
progress by requiring disclosure of technological advances as a “quid pro quo”
of patent exclusivity.108
Despite trade secrecy’s long legacy, its role in intellectual property law has
always been a bit puzzling and, as a result, controversial. While legal trade
secrecy protection presumably extends the market exclusivity afforded by
practical secrecy, secrecy is in tension with patent law’s strong emphasis on
promoting disclosure of new inventions. Moreover, because trade secret law
encompasses secret information that would not qualify for patent (or copyright)
protection, it is also in some tension with patent doctrine’s “notion that
[unpatentable] concepts within the public grasp, or those so obvious that they
readily could be, are the tools of creation available to all.”109 Above and beyond
these foundational questions about the social costs of secrecy, there has also
been considerable scholarly debate about whether, even in ordinary commercial

104. See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 23 N.Y.S.3d 820, 829 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (“To the extent they claim it
would be easier to perform the calculations with the actual program software, the computer program itself is
proprietary and the Court is not ordering its disclosure.”).
105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
106. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 47–48 (2008)
(explaining the idea of copyright as a response to the “tragedy of the commons”).
107. See, e.g., Yafit Lev-Aretz & Katherine J. Strandburg, Regulation and Innovation: Approaching Market
Failure from Both Sides, 38 YALE J. REGUL. ONLINE BULL. 1, 3 (2020) https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/
jregonline/2.
108. See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 36 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard
C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004) (“The quid pro quo for giving the patent holder the right to exclude others
is to compel disclosure of the invention in terms that enable others to replicate, modify, and circumvent it.”);
Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 S.M.U. L. REV. 123, 131–32 (2006).
109. Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 156–57 (1989).
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contexts, trade secrecy protection is overbroad in light of tradeoffs between the
social costs and benefits of market exclusivity.110
Hovering over this debate about trade secrecy doctrine is the question of
whether innovators should be forced to rely on more carefully tailored patent
and copyright protections, rather than trade secrecy law, to deter free riders.
Though the Supreme Court confronted this puzzle to some extent in Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,111 its holding rested heavily on the misappropriationrelated concerns expressed in the quote above, while its analysis of trade secrecy
as an innovation promoter was arguably both empirically dubious112 and
analytically questionable in light of the Court’s own later pronouncements.113
In the ordinary commercial context, the misappropriation and free-riderbased justifications for trade secrecy are unavoidably intertwined because those
who produce trade secret information would have the option to rely on practical
secrecy even if legal trade secrecy protection were not available. The policy
question is thus not whether trade secrecy itself is a good idea but whether legal
trade secrecy protection is a socially beneficial supplement to practical secrecy.
Practical secrecy is not an option, however, for many innovations and essentially
all expressive works, which are self-disclosing once they are put on the
market.114 In these run-of-the-mill situations, we assume that the policy balances
enshrined in patent and copyright doctrines, which cover some aspects of some
products and deny protection to others, are sufficient.
It is thus worth bearing in mind that court-ordered disclosure of the
workings of forensic evidence tools would leave their creators no worse off than
the many creators of self-disclosing innovations. Innovative forensic evidence
tools are protectable by copyrights and patents to the same extent as other
technologies. Software source code, for example, is covered by copyright to the

110. See generally Bone, supra note 90; Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret
Law, 92 TEX. L. R. 1803 (2014). THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH 490 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., 2012).
111. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
112. See, e.g., id. at 487–90, where the Court asserts that inventors of patentable or potentially patentable
technologies will not opt to rely on trade secrecy because “trade secret law provides far weaker protection.”
113. Compare, e.g., Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484 (“Certainly the patent policy of encouraging invention is not
disturbed by the existence of another form of incentive to invention”), with Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156–57
(“Both the novelty and the nonobviousness requirements of federal patent law are grounded in the notion that
concepts within the public grasp, or those so obvious that they readily could be, are the tools of creation available
to all . . . . Moreover, through the creation of patent-like rights, the States could essentially redirect inventive
efforts away from the careful criteria of patentability developed by Congress over the last 200 years.”).
114. We note that the core of some innovations remain secret even when the item is put on the market. A
classic example of this is a recipe—like the secret formula for Coke. That is, the introduction of the product to
the market does not provide information on the hidden contents of the product, which can remain protected by
trade secret. In contrast, other innovations are self-disclosing when put on the market, such as writings or
products that can be easily reverse engineered. For this second group of innovations, secrecy is necessarily
destroyed by putting the innovative item on the market. Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get:
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 105–07 (2004).
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extent it contains protectable expression,115 meaning that potential competitors
could not simply copy and adopt it wholesale, but would probably have to
engage in significant recoding. Patent protection, while recently reined in by the
Supreme Court, also remains available for certain sorts of software-related
inventions.116 In fact, since court-ordered disclosure would presumably apply to
all players in forensic technology markets, it would be particularly easy for
holders of copyright and patent rights to enforce those protections by monitoring
their competitors’ mandated disclosures. There is longstanding debate about the
desirability and adequacy of copyright and patent protections for software.117
Whatever one’s perspective on this general debate, there seems no reason to
expect that patent and copyright protections are distinctively inadequate to
incentivize forensic evidence tool innovation.
D. TRADE SECRECY, FREE RIDERS AND FIRST MOVER ADVANTAGES IN
MARKETS FOR FORENSIC EVIDENCE TECHNOLOGY
This Subpart explores how the characteristics of forensic evidence
technology markets tend to further undermine the force of the free rider
justification for trade secrecy by prolonging first mover exclusivity. The
distinctive first mover advantages in these markets arise from the fact that they
are driven by customer demand for judicial admissibility. This Subpart uses our
case study of PG as a springboard for analyzing these distinctive characteristics
and their implications for the free rider justification for trade secrecy.
From an intellectual property perspective, market exclusivity for
innovators should be sufficient to allow them to recoup their free-rideable
investments. Beyond that, however, the goal is to cap exclusivity so as to
promote—not avoid—healthy market competition and follow-on innovation.118
Free-rideable investments are those, such as R&D expenses, that competitors
can avoid by simply copying the innovator. Other sorts of investments—in raw
materials, building a manufacturing plant and so forth—are not free-rideable.
Moreover, not all free-rideable investments require legal protection. Even in the
absence of intellectual property protections, first movers ordinarily enjoy some
period of market exclusivity as a result of factors such as the time it takes
competitors to ramp up production and convince consumers to purchase the new
product. In some markets, the first mover exclusivity period is further prolonged
by various sorts of barriers to entry.119 First mover advantages alone are often
sufficient to allow innovators to recoup their free-rideable investments without
115. 17 U.S.C. § 117; see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d
Cir. 1983) (declaring computer software code to have the same copyright protection as literary works).
116. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,898,021 (filed Feb. 2, 2001) (TrueAllele patent).
117. See, e.g., Meghan J. Ryan, Secret Algorithms, IP Rights, and the Public Interest, 21 NEV. L.J. 61
(2020); JAMES BESSEN AND MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2009).
118. See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
119. See Lev-Aretz & Strandburg, supra note 107.
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the need for further protection. Indeed, this point is a primary justification for
patent law’s refusal to award patents to “obvious” inventions.120
To understand whether a trade secrecy privilege is important for promoting
innovation in forensic evidence technology, we thus need to understand (1) the
extent to which the trade secret privilege covers costly free-rideable investments
that are not protectable by copyrights and patents and (2) the sources of first
mover exclusivity in those markets. Court-ordered disclosure will not threaten
innovation incentives if first mover exclusivity from other sources, combined
with copyright and patent protection, is sufficient to allow innovators to recoup
their free-rideable investments.
Forensic evidence technology markets are driven by admissibility doctrines
and judicial practices. These driving forces create distinctively robust first
mover exclusivity mechanisms, over and above the conventional sources.
Admissibility doctrines also cabin the sorts of trade secrets that suppliers of these
tools can maintain. Taken together, these features lessen the chance that courtordered disclosure will be the last straw that deters innovation.
1. Admissibility Drives Markets for Forensic Evidence Technology
Anyone seeking to enter any market must assess current or potential
customer demand and determine how to meet that demand. The direct customers
for forensic evidence technology are forensic laboratories. Their demand
piggybacks primarily on the demand of prosecutors and law enforcement for
tools that will produce admissible evidence that will lead to convictions.
Admissibility in court is thus critical to a forensic evidence technology’s market
viability. With the possible exception of certain trend-setting federal
laboratories, those who procure forensic evidence tools will strongly prefer to
purchase tools that they can be confident will produce admissible results.
Purveyors of probabilistic genotyping tools clearly recognize the
importance of admissibility to marketability. For example, an entire page on the
website of Cybergenetics, the corporate home of TrueAllele, is devoted to
documenting admissibility opinions and orders signed by trial judges from
around the country,121 providing potential customers with up-to-date
admissibility precedent. Similarly, the STRmix website and the blog of STRmix

120. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966) (“The inherent problem [underlying the
nonobviousness requirement] was to develop some means of weeding out those inventions which would not be
disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a patent.”); Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of
Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 31 (1992) (“In a recent study of a large number of companies, a team of
economists found that in most industries advantages associated with a head start, including establishment of
production and distribution facilities, and moving rapidly down a learning curve, were judged significantly more
effective than patents in enabling a firm to reap returns from innovation.”).
121. TrueAllele Admissibility, CYBERGENETICS,
https://www.cybgen.com/information/admissibility/
page.shtml (last visited Mar. 21, 2022).
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creator John Buckleton are regularly updated with posts reporting favorable
admissibility decisions.122
The admissibility of scientific evidence is governed by two different
standards:123 some state courts continue to employ the Frye standard, based on
a 1923 D.C. Circuit decision,124 while federal courts and a majority of state
courts now apply the more multi-faceted Daubert standard, first enunciated by
the Supreme Court in 1993125 as an interpretation of Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.126 The Frye standard looks to whether a technique is
generally accepted in the “relevant scientific community,”127 while the Daubert
rule purports to position judges as the “gatekeepers” of scientific evidence,128
who are to employ factors that include whether the technique has been
“subjected to peer review and publication” and whether it is “generally accepted
in the scientific community.” Importantly, under both Daubert and Frye,
validation studies, especially those published in peer-reviewed journals, play a
central role in the admissibility determination. Such studies appear to address
both Frye’s over-riding concern with community acceptance and Daubert’s
over-arching concern with accuracy and reliability. (Of course, it is possible that
validation studies also play a more direct role in signaling the quality of the tool
to potential adopters.)
The importance of admissibility to marketability tends to enhance first
mover exclusivity and suppress the extent to which disclosure facilitates free
riding in three ways: First, because general principles must be disclosed to meet
admissibility standards and software is protected by copyright, disclosure of
122. STRmix, NICHEVISION, https://nichevision.com/strmix (last visited Mar. 21, 2022) (“Additionally, there
have been at least 22 successful admissibility hearings for STRmix™ in the U.S.”); News, STRMIX,
https://www.strmix.com/#news (last visited Mar. 21, 2022) (including posts detailing state court admissibility
decisions).
123. Bruce Kaufman, States Slow to Adopt Daubert Evidence Rule, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 26, 2016)
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/states-slow-to-adopt-daubert-scientific-evidence-rule
(“More than two decades after the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the Daubert test for evaluating the reliability of
scientific evidence in federal courtrooms, nearly a quarter of the states have retained their own standards. In
many of the holdout jurisdictions—including California, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Maryland, Washington
and the District of Columbia—the standard for admitting expert evidence in courtrooms closely follows the
century-old Frye test, which was developed for evaluating then-novel polygraph testimony.”).
124. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
125. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
126. FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule 702 was amended in 2000, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), clarifying that the standard applies to all expert testimony. The
2000 amendment “affirms the trial court’s role as gatekeeper and provides some general standards that the trial
court must use to assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered expert testimony.” FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory
committee’s notes to 2000 amendment.
127. See Kaufman, supra note 123; Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
128. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. The opinion set out what it characterized as a nonexclusive set of factors
that “bear on the inquiry[:]” (1) whether the technique “can be (and has been) tested,” (2) whether the technique
has been “subjected to peer review and publication,” (3) the technique’s “known or potential rate of error,” (4)
“the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the techniques operation” and, folding in the old Frye
test, (5) the degree of acceptance in the relevant expert community. See id. 593–94. These factors now dominate
the admissibility analysis in Daubert jurisdictions.
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source code and implementation details provides only limited opportunities for
competitor free riding. Second, once one tool is deemed admissible, the needs
to implement and validate a new tool and demonstrate its admissibility in court
creates switching costs for customers. Third, and perhaps most significantly,
judges routinely treat previous decisions about admissibility or trade secret
privilege for a given product as highly persuasive precedent, even when those
decisions are from other jurisdictions and are sparsely reasoned.129
2. Admissibility and Limits on Free-Rideable Secrets
Court-ordered disclosure of trade secrets can only facilitate problematic
free riding to the extent that it reveals secrets that reflect costly, free-rideable
investments in innovation. Scientific evidence doctrine cabins this possibility
from both directions.
On the one hand, the emphasis on published validation studies and the
general scope of the admissibility inquiry limits the extent to which evidence
technology innovators can rely on trade secrecy regarding truly innovative tools.
Both courts and validation study peer reviewers will demand disclosure of
underlying principles and methods and general implementation descriptions.130
Because these basics must be disclosed for purposes of admissibility, they are
not protectable by trade secrecy.131
That leaves a window of free-rideable investment corresponding to the cost
of “development,” that is, determining how to implement the underlying
principles in a useable tool. The size of that cost, both in absolute terms and
relative to the overall investment required to enter the market, depends on
specifics. For PG, as discussed above, the general principles and methods of
probabilistic genotyping are publicly available,132 while trade secrecy is asserted
in source code, parameters and the like.133 Court-ordered disclosure of these
sorts of secrets would, at most, save competitors the cost of doing their own
coding and parameter selection. Of course, companies will argue that these
remaining secrets embody the “secret sauce” they depend upon for competitive
advantage, but it is unclear whether they truly involve substantial innovation (or
investment).
For source code, the potential for free riding on court-ordered disclosure is
narrowed still further by copyright protection, which accrues automatically.

129. See, e.g., State v. Simmer, 935 N.W.2d 167, 181 (Neb. 2019); People v. Lang, No. F075921, 2019 WL
5205997, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2019); People v. Belle, 16 N.Y.S.3d 793 at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
130. See supra Part II.D.1.
131. In any event, it seems as though such basic innovations often are taken from academic research or other
public sources.
132. See supra Part I.A.
133. See State v. Superior Court (Chubbs), No. B258569, 2015 WL 139069, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9,
2015) (“As pertinent here, the People explained that they requested the source code from Cybergenetics, but
Cybergenetics did not turn it over because it is a trade secret. The People argued that disclosure of the source
code would be ‘financially devastating’ to Cybergenetics.”).
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Though copyright does not cover software’s functionality, and it is hard to
predict how courts will interpret its scope in particular programs, it certainly
precludes rote copying of source code and requires competitors to engage in
significant re-coding.134
On the flip side, copying an innovator’s technology does not exempt
competitors from the need to validate their own tools for admissibility purposes.
While courts do put some weight on prior validation of general methods, and
sometimes even of related tools, validation costs are at best partially freerideable. Thus, even if a later competitor claims to employ a previously validated
method, the new implementation of the method ordinarily will still have to be
validated by separate, preferably published, studies. Validation studies will
ordinarily be both time-consuming and costly. The time required for peer review
and publication alone can be substantial and thus extend the first mover
exclusivity period.135 In fact, the validation process may even be more costly
and slower for latecomers than for first movers. Validation studies often require
specialized equipment, samples or data that are most cheaply accessible from
forensic laboratories or law enforcement sources. Those players may have few
incentives to cooperate with second comers, especially if they are not forensic
insiders.
Aspects of the market for probabilistic genotyping tools support this
analysis. Despite trade secrecy protection of TrueAllele and STRmix source
code, there are several open-source tools available, suggesting that
implementing basic PG methods in code is not terribly costly.136 Nonetheless, it
is private, closed-source technology that is dominating the marketplace, and no
open-source tools appeared in our case study into lower-court admissibility
decisions. This situation at least suggests that barriers to entry associated with
validation costs are significant. Notably, John Buckleton, the force behind
STRmix’s successful competitive entry into the PG market, is a consummate
forensic insider, who undoubtedly had an inside track to validation resources.
In sum, admissibility standards for forensic evidence limit the scope of
potentially free-rideable information that could be covered by the trade secret
134. The extent of re-coding required would depend on the amount of protectable “expression” contained
with the code. The amount of re-coding required depends on specifics and involves a fairly complicated
copyright analysis. It is, however, probably safe to say that re-writing a competitor’s code to avoid copyright
infringement is a substantial undertaking, probably requiring legal consultation, particularly when it is virtually
certain that the originator will have easy access to the new version for purposes of enforcement.
135. See Vivian M. Nguyen, Neal R. Haddaway, Lee F. G. Gutowsky, Alexander D. M. Wilson, Austin J.
Gallagher, Michael R. Donaldson, Neil Hammerschlag & Steven J. Cooke, How Long Is Too Long in
Contemporary Peer Review? Perspectives from Authors Publishing in Conservation Biology Journals, 10 PLOS
ONE 1, 2 (Aug. 12, 2015), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0132557
(explaining that peer review “may still stretch into months or even years”).
136. See, e.g., Øyvind Bleka, Mayra Eduardoff, Carla Santos, Chris Phillips, Walther Parson & Peter Gill,
Open Source Software EuroForMix Can Be Used to Analyse Complex SNP Mixtures, 31 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L
GENETICS 105 (2017); Sho Manabe, Chie Morimoto, Yuya Hamano, Shuntaro Fujimoto & Keiji Tamaki,
Development and Validation of Open-Source Software for DNA Mixture Interpretation Based on a Quantitative
Continuous Model, 12 PLOS ONE 1 (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5693437.
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privilege and, concomitantly, the impact that disclosure of trade secrets can have
on innovation incentives. Meanwhile, all market entrants confront substantial
non-free-rideable validation costs, which may even be heightened for later
entrants. Court-mandated disclosure of the source code, parameters and
similarly specific implementation details that are currently protected by trade
secret privileges are unlikely to provide much advantage to free riding
competitors. Notably, however, such disclosure can have significant public
payoffs in uncovering problematic implementations, as illustrated by the FST
debacle described above.137 These social benefits can be large even when the
potential for free riding is small because they are unrelated to the size of the
R&D investments that produced the secret information.
3. Switching Costs
The market significance of admissibility creates distinctive consumer
switching costs in these markets that also can extend first mover exclusivity
periods. Switching to a competing tool is likely to require costly re-training of
laboratory personnel and internal validation of a particular lab’s implementation.
Switching costs will be amplified by the need to establish the admissibility of
the new tool in the local courts. The importance of admissibility to purchasers is
captured clearly in the Cuyahoga County Board of Control’s agenda for a
meeting that resulted in a decision to purchase the forensic tool TrueAllele:
“The True Allele Casework system has been extensively validated and used
by forensic laboratories in the United States. In addition, the True Allele
casework system has been through admissibility hearings in 6 US states
including Ohio which is a great advantage for the laboratory. This means that
the laboratory will not have to go through the admissibility hearing to get the
True Allele results accepted in court.”138

These sorts of cost considerations will surely affect any agency’s
willingness to switch to a competitor’s tool once a first mover’s tool has been
adopted. The pattern of PG tool adoptions supports this observation. States that
initially adopted TrueAllele have stayed with it, despite the current popularity
of STRmix among new adopters of PG technology.
The switching costs associated with establishing admissibility in one
jurisdiction will diminish once the admissibility of a new entrant’s tool becomes
established elsewhere. But adoption is apt to be delayed nonetheless while
laboratories sort out the collective action problem associated with shouldering
the costs of the first few admissibility hearings.

137. See supra Part I.B.
138. Meeting Agenda of the Board of Control of Cuyahoga County, CUYAHOGA CTY. BDS & COMM’N (June
15, 2015), http://bc.cuyahogacounty.us/en-US/Board-of-Control.aspx?Year=2015.
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4. Judicial Precedent and the Network Effects of Admissibility Decisions
In this Subpart, we use an in-depth study of judicial opinions regarding
trade secrecy and admissibility for probabilistic genotyping software to illustrate
how judicial practices regarding admissibility produce a rich-get-richer network
effect that is likely to substantially enhance first mover market exclusivity, even
if disclosure is required. These network effects arise from the way in which
courts rely on adoption by forensic labs as evidence of a tool’s scientific
acceptability and then piggyback on previous admissibility determinations, even
from outside of their own jurisdictions.
One of the first U.S. courts to directly address the admissibility of PG in a
written opinion was the Pennsylvania Superior Court in 2012. During the murder
trial of former Pennsylvania state trooper Kevin James Foley, prosecutors sought
to admit a likelihood ratio generated by the TrueAllele casework system as
evidence that Foley’s DNA was present at the crime scene.139 The defense
objected under Pennsylvania’s particular variant of the Frye test on grounds that
the tool was both “novel” and not “generally accepted” by the relevant
community of scientists.140 The trial court rejected the defense challenge at the
first stage of analysis, finding that probabilistic genotyping was not “novel”
because, or so the judge believed, it was little more than a “refined application
of the ‘product rule,’ a method for calculating probabilities that is used in
forensic DNA analysis.”141 Foley appealed.
While not directly endorsing the largely erroneous142 reasoning that PG is
merely a refinement of the product rule, the Superior Court affirmed the finding
that PG was not novel on the grounds that there was “no legitimate dispute
regarding the reliability of the expert’s conclusions.”143 The court based this
conclusion in part on then-current uses “by New York State for all of their data
banking and bringing their casework system on board” and by the UK’s Forensic
Science Service and on the fact that “Allegheny County Crime Lab has been
using our system as a service and recently purchased the system for looking at
mixtures in complex cases and DNA evidence” and that the World Trade Center
had engaged the company to conduct analysis relating to the identification of
victim remains.144 The court also relied heavily on the existence of two peerreviewed validation studies, both authored by TrueAllele’s creator, Mark
Perlin.145
For many reasons, Pennsylvania v. Foley is an important early case in this
area. The Superior Court’s conclusions regarding the admissibility of TrueAllele
evidence in spite of the tool’s secret source code have been repeatedly echoed,
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 888 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
Id.
Id.
See Appendix.
Foley, 38 A.3d at 888.
Id. at 889.
Id.
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or directly cited, by trial courts all across the country.146 In this way, the
acceptance by the Pennsylvania Superior Court of TrueAllele evidence in this
case establishes the first node in a network of favorable admissibility decisions,
which are referenced again and again by courts, creating a rich get richer effect
regarding the admissibility of these tools.
The effect of judicial reliance on earlier admissibility decisions is
exacerbated by a distinct tendency to cite judicial admissibility decisions as
evidence of “general acceptance.” In doing so, judges appear to conflate the
familiar concept of persuasive legal precedent with the more relevant question
of acceptance by the scientific community. While a legal interpretation may
become more persuasive if more judges have adopted it, a forensic tool does not
become more generally accepted by the scientific community simply because
more courts have agreed that it is generally accepted by that community.
For example, in January 2019, a trial judge in Georgia issued a ruling which
included, under the heading “TrueAllele’s Widespread Acceptance,” the
statement: “Courts accepting TrueAllele evidence include California, Florida,
Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, Washington, the United States Federal Courts (Eastern District of
Virginia), United States Marine Corps, Northern Ireland, and Australia.”147 The
same order included a list of “[e]ighteen admissibility decisions in the United
States”148 under the heading “TrueAllele is Reliable.”
The compounding of judicial admissibility rulings is evident when one
looks further into this list. The earliest of the cited cases was the Pennsylvania
Superior Court’s opinion in Foley. Notably, a striking number of the other cited
opinions themselves cite to Foley, including orders from Virginia v. Brady
(2013),149 Ohio v. Shaw (2014),150 New York v. Wakefield (2015),151 Washington
v. Fair (2017),152 and Florida v. Lajayvian Daniels (2018).153 Many of those
opinions are themselves cited in other decisions on the list. For example, the
2015 decision in New York v. Wakefield was cited by an Ohio appellate court in
2021 in a discussion of the tool’s general acceptance, and is referenced for its
“compilation of cases accepting True Allele.”154 Together, all of the TrueAllele

146. See, e.g., State v. Simmer, 935 N.W.2d 167, 181 (Neb. 2019); People v. Lang, No. F075921, 2019 WL
5205997, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2019); People v. Belle, 16 N.Y.S.3d 793 at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
147. Order, State v. Nundra, No. 18-CR-134, at *2–3 (Ga. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 2019).
148. Id. at *5–6.
149. Order, Commonwealth v. Brady, Nos. CR11-465-01,-02,-03, & -04 and CR11-494-01, -02, -03, & 04, (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 17, 2013).
150. Order, State v. Shaw, No. CR-13-575691 (Ohio Ct. Com. Oct. 10, 2014).
151. Order, People v. Wakefield, 9 N.Y.S.3d 540 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
152. Order, State v. Fair, No. 10-1-09274-5 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2016).
153. Order, State v. Daniels, No. 2015CF009320AMB, at 3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 31, 2018) (Under the heading
“TrueAllele’s Widespread Acceptance” we find: “TrueAllele’s reliability has been confirmed in appellate
precedent in Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882 (Pa. Super. 2012).”).
154. State v. Preston, No. CR-18-634913-A (Ohio Ct. App. July 1, 2021).
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admissibility decisions we were able to gather create the striking crossjurisdictional network of citation and reliance illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.
“Network effects” traditionally arise when a product’s value to a potential
consumer grows with the number of existing consumers.155 Network effects
make it more difficult for new entrants to compete or gain a foothold in the
market, even if they introduce qualitatively better products. Social networking
services provide a classic example of products that benefit from a network effect:
the more people there are who use the service, the more appealing the network
becomes to potential future users. Here, our research suggests an analogous
effect. A forensic evidence tool’s attractiveness to potential purchasers depends
on the likelihood that its results will be deemed admissible by local courts.
Because of the way that courts rely on previous admissibility decisions, the
marketability of a forensic evidence tool grows as it accumulates favorable
admissibility decisions, regardless of jurisdiction. A favorable admissibility
decision for a PG company, therefore, confers a market advantage upon a
product that extends beyond the product’s acceptance in the jurisdiction holding
the hearing. This cumulative effect makes it more difficult for a newcomer to
enter the market and thus extends first mover advantages.
Prosecutorial submissions of court orders from other jurisdictions as
exhibits to admissibility hearings suggest that they are well aware of these
effects. For example, at a 2018 Daubert hearing in Davidson County, Tennessee,
prosecutors submitted a “binder containing 13 decisions from other
jurisdictions,”156 while a court in Chemung County, New York listed among the
People’s evidence “People’s Exhibit #12 (‘Admissibility Rulings’), comprising
20 court decisions ruling on TrueAllele’s admissibility”157
Judicial orders suggest that this prosecutorial tactic is persuasive. For
example, a number of recent orders admitting TrueAllele results incorporate
nearly identical paragraphs including the sentence: “Courts accepting
TrueAllele evidence include California, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, the
United States Federal Courts (Eastern District of Virginia), United States Marine
Corps, Northern Ireland, and Australia.”158 In effect, admission by other courts
seems to be playing the role of the Frye standard’s “general acceptance in the
relevant scientific community.”159

155. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L.
REV. 479, 483 (1998).
156. State v. Watkins, No. 2017-C-1811, at 12–14 (Tenn. Crim. Ct. Dec. 17, 2018).
157. State v. Wilson, No. 2013-331, at 3 (Chemung, N.Y. Cnty. Ct. May 1, 2019).
158. State v. Daniels, No. 2015CF009320AMB, at 3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 31, 2018); State v. Nundra, No. 18CR-134, at 2–3 (Ga. Super. Ct. Jan. 21, 2019); State v. Baugh, No. 2017-CR-618, at 8 (Ga. Super. Ct. Mar. 22,
2019).
159. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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Cases dealing with TrueAllele’s key competitor, STRmix, exhibit the same
sort of network pattern. Like the TrueAllele cases, the STRmix cases begin with
a cornerstone written admissibility decision. In a 2015 order in the case of
Michigan v. Elamin Muhammad,160 a Muskegon County trial court admitted
evidence generated by the STRmix tool in what appears to be the first recorded
decision on the tool. In support of its decision to admit STRmix evidence, the
court emphasized that “at least two cases in New York utilized opinions based
on STRmix evaluations.”161 This first STRmix decision also illustrates the
limitations on trade secrecy’s role in this market, given the doctrinal requirement
that basic principles must be disclosed. Its decision not only relied on previous
STRmix cases, but also noted that “courts in Pennsylvania, Virginia, New York
and Ohio have admitted results from a program based upon similar principles
[TrueAllele].”162
The next court to take up the issue of STRmix admissibility in a written
order was back in New York.163 Interestingly, that case makes no mention of the
two New York opinions cited by the Michigan court in Muhammad, but instead
cites heavily to the Michigan court.164 Thus, the New York court in BullardDaniel states that “this case concerns the first judicial review, as far as this court
is aware, of STRmix in New York,” and that “[t]here is only one reported
decision involving STRmix, from Michigan, where the court applied Daubert
and upheld the admissibility of DNA test results.”165 The Bullard-Daniel court
devotes substantial attention to the Michigan decision, stating the name of the
case eight times and summarizing that court’s reasoning in substantial detail.166
160. State v. Muhammad, No. 14-65263-FC (Muskegon Co. Dec. 15, 2015) (Hon. William C. Marietti) (on
file with authors).
161. Id. The two New York opinions noted by the Muskegon County court appear to be unreported, and the
authors have been unable to locate them.
162. Id.
163. See People v. Bullard-Daniel, 42 N.Y.S.3d 714, 715 (Niagara Cnty. Ct. 2016).
164. Id. at 721.
165. Id. at 720.
166. The Bullard-Daniel court explains:
Of course, this Court would expect that the statement referred to above would add another arrow in
the quiver of defense counsel that would be used to undermine the STRmix results when the issue is
presented to the trial jury, but it does not affect the issue of the general acceptance of STRmix within
the relevant scientific community. State v. Muhammad, No. 14-65263-FC (Muskegon Co. Dec. 15,
2015) (Hon. William C. Marietti) (on file with authors), is the only other reported case in the country
regarding the admissibility of STRmix. There, the court concluded as a preliminary matter that
statistical evaluation of the DNA analysis’s results is a matter of evidentiary weight, not
admissibility.’ Thus, the court’s determination of admissibility falls into the category of dicta.
Nonetheless, the court reached several conclusions, which are persuasive insofar as this Court is
faced with identical issues. First, the Muhammad court found that STRmix ‘received adequate
validity testing.’ Indeed, Dr. Buckleton testified in Muhammad, and it was anticipated, based on
preliminary representations made to this Court by the People, that he would testify here. His
testimony could have resolved several questions raised by the cross-examination testimony of Dr.
Simich and the direct testimony of Dr. Skuse. Notwithstanding Dr. Buckleton’s failure to testify here,
Dr. Simich’s testimony was sufficient to meet the People’s burden of establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that STRmix was generally accepted in the relevant scientific
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Despite noting that the out-of-state precedent was only “dicta,” the New York
court found the Michigan decision “persuasive insofar as this Court is faced with
identical issues.”167
From there, the STRmix cases begin to form a citation network that
resembles the one we see in the TrueAllele cases, as shown in Figures 2 and 3.
For instance, in 2018, the Bullard-Daniel decision was cited in published
opinions from California, New Mexico, and the Virgin Islands168 in support of
the acceptance of TrueAllele. Before long, trial courts began issuing decisions
expressly relying on a network of inter-jurisdiction admissibility precedent. For
example, in a 2020 decision addressing the admissibility of STRmix evidence
under Colorado’s expert evidence admissibility standard (called Shreck), Judge
Marcelo Kopcow of the Weld County Court wrote that “[c]onsidering factors
similar to those outlined in Shreck, courts in at least Colorado, Illinois,
Wyoming, New York, New Mexico, Minnesota, Michigan, Connecticut,
Florida, California, and the Virgin Islands have found probabilistic genotyping
and STRmix sufficiently reliable to be admitted and submitted to the Jury.”169
These citation patterns show that courts confronted with challenges to the
admissibility of a particular PG tool have relied heavily on previous
admissibility opinions concerning that tool, regardless of jurisdiction. This
network of admissibility strengthens first mover advantages, making it more
difficult for competitors to enter the market, while also sometimes seeming to
conflate judicial agreement about admissibility with general acceptance in the
scientific community. STRmix entered the market at a time when PG technology
was relatively new and many states had yet to adopt it. At that early stage, when
the admissibility of the basic method was being established, STRmix was able
to benefit to some extent from decisions admitting TrueAllele in other
jurisdictions. Once a jurisdiction has adopted a particular tool, however, courts’
reliance on precedent in making admissibility decisions compounds the barriers
to entry that a new entrant would face.
Recently, a state appellate court in New Jersey bucked this trend, and in
doing so, became the first (to our knowledge) to look critically at the network of
precedent laid before it by state prosecutors and TrueAllele’s Mark Perlin. New
Jersey v. Pickett became “the first appeal in New Jersey addressing the science
underlying the proffered testimony by the State’s expert, who designed, utilized,

community. Significantly, Dr. Simich testified in Muhammad and that court found his testimony
relevant and significant. Dr. Simich reported the results of the Commission and the DNA
subcommittee and the Muhammad court discussed those results in a positive light.
Id. at 725–26.
167. Id. at 725.
168. United States v. Russell, No. CR-14-2563 MCA, 2018 WL 7286831, at *8 (D.N.M. Jan. 10, 2018);
People v. Dominguez, 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 71 (2018); People v. Blash, No. ST-2015-CR-0000156, 2018 WL
4062322, at *8 (V.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2018).
169. Order, People v. Hendrix, No. 2018CR1767 (Weld, Colo. Cnty. Ct. May 4, 2020).
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and relied upon TrueAllele.”170 The Pickett court noted that Perlin “[s]ubmitted
a seventy-eight paragraph declaration documenting,” among other things,
“TrueAllele’s purported widespread acceptance.”171
The Pickett court proceeded to both recognize and reject the strange
network effect of judicial precedent placed before it. This portion of the court’s
decision, which includes a list of several of the major cases on our network map,
tracks so closely with our own observations that it bears quoting at length:
The first court to address the question of admissibility was Commonwealth v.
Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 889-90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012), where the court accepted
Dr. Perlin’s assertion that validation studies are the best tests of the reliability
of source codes. The court reasoned that “scientists can validate the reliability
of a computerized process even if the ‘source code’ underlying that process is
not available to the public,” emphasizing that making the source code
available would have market consequences. [ . . . ] Subsequent courts have
placed great emphasis on the observation made in Foley, without further
scrutiny, creating an authority “house of cards.” See, e.g., People v. Superior
Court (Chubbs), No. B258569, 2015 WL 139069, at *8 (Cal. App. Ct. Jan. 9,
2015); State v. Daniels, No. 2015CF009320AMB (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 31, 2018)
(slip op. at 3); **307 State v. Wakefield, 47 Misc.3d 850, 9 N.Y.S.3d 540, 541
(Sup. Ct. 2015); State v. Shaw, No. CR-13-575691 (Ohio C.P. Ct. Cuyahoga
Cnty. Oct. 10, 2014) (slip op. at 23); Commonwealth v. Knight, No. 379 WDA
2017, 2017 WL 5951725, at *6 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 2017); State v.
Watkins, No. 2017-C-1811 (Tenn. Crim. Ct. Davidson Cnty. Dec. 17, 2018)
(slip op. at 13-14). Published out-of-state judicial decisions, although
persuasive rather than binding, carry great weight, especially after they are
cited by other courts. A long line of decisions uniformly in favor of a legal
proposition suggests that a legal proposition is generally accepted. We are
mindful, however, that in science, the repetition of authority does not
automatically establish reliability for purposes of a Frye hearing.172

The Pickett court ultimately ordered the TrueAllele source code released
to the defense pursuant to a protective order, holding that “[t]he cases identified
by the State include a laundry list of admissibility rulings, but to reiterate, none
consider whether the TrueAllele source code itself correctly implements its
methods, which can only be tested in the manner defendant and amici advocate
for here.”173
At least one other court has already partially adopted the laudable approach
expressed in the Pickett decision. The United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania recently cited Pickett in declining to quash a
subpoena for TrueAllele’s source code, holding that “some level of access to the
source code, with proper protections, represents a reasonable outcome.”174
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

State v. Pickett, 246 A.3d 279, 283 (N.J. App. Div. 2021).
Id. at 286.
Id. at 306–07 (footnote omitted).
Id.
United States v. Ellis, No. 19-369, 2021 WL 1600711, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2021).
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It remains to be seen how many other courts will adopt the reasoning laid
out in Pickett, particularly state and local courts in states where appellate
authority already exists approving the admissibility of TrueAllele or STRmix
without ordering any source code disclosure. Indeed, important state court
orders and decisions issued more recently than the Pickett decision continue to
find general acceptance of TrueAllele technology, without disclosure or review
of the source code, based on the same arguments regarding prior interjurisdictional admissibility decisions. For example, the New York State
Appellate Division, Third Department, deciding on appeal that TrueAllele
evidence had been properly admitted, recently found persuasive the fact that “at
the time in question, courts in at least three other states had found the TrueAllele
Casework system to be reliable under the Frye standard.”175 Another example
comes from an appellate decision in Florida challenging the admission of
TrueAllele evidence, where, in response to the defendant-appellant’s concern
that no internal validation had been done on the lab in question, the District
Court of Appeals for Florida’s Fourth district found it notable that “the
Cybergenetics DNA analyst testified that in eight of the admissibility challenges
against TrueAllele in prior cases where the TrueAllele evidence was ruled
admissible, there was never any internal validation done on the lab from which
the data came nor was the lack of internal validation on a specific lab’s data an
issue for the reliability of the evidence.”176
These recent decisions, complemented by numerous recent court orders
listed on TrueAllele’s website,177 for example, demonstrate the continuing
influence that the network effect we have observed exerts on the universe of PG
admissibility decisions and on the PG marketplace as a whole. At the same time,
the novel analysis of the Pickett decision offers a glimpse into what it might look
like if, to quote that court, this “house of cards” of judicial authority were to fall.
If, let’s imagine, under the Pickett ruling, state and local courts were to begin
ordering source code disclosure under protective order, and if independent
review by defense experts were to become more common as a result, perhaps
the value of admissibility precedent to these market players would be
comparably diminished. For now, though, and for the nearly ten years that have
elapsed since the Foley decision, the persuasiveness, impact and value of this
network effect has been, and remains, measurable and significant.
E. THE DUBIOUS VALUE OF TRADE SECRET PRIVILEGES FOR PROMOTING
INNOVATIVE FORENSIC EVIDENCE TECHNOLOGY
Pulling the above observations together, we conclude that it is
unreasonable to assume that trade secret privileges are important for preserving
incentives for forensic evidence technology innovation. The trade secret
175. People v. Wilson, 143 N.Y.S.3d 466, 468 (2021).
176. Daniels v. State, 312 So. 3d 926, 929 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
177. TrueAllele Admissibility, supra note 121.
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information at issue, such as source code and implementation parameters, is of
narrow scope and may not encompass the most innovative aspects of the
technology. Even if the trade secret information at issue reflects substantial R&D
investment, competitors ordinarily cannot simply copy the court-ordered
disclosure and grab a share of the market without falling afoul of copyright or
patent protections that survive disclosure. Moreover, potential market entrants
must conduct costly and time-consuming validation studies and will confront
significant switching costs and network effects created by admissibility doctrine
and judicial practice. It thus seems quite likely that, even with court-mandated
disclosure of source code, parameters and so forth, first mover exclusivity will
be more than adequate to recoup R&D investments in free-rideable trade secret
information. The questionable social benefits of trade secrecy are highly
unlikely to outweigh the significant social benefits of public disclosure. For this
reason, we do not think protective orders covering disclosures about forensic
evidence technology should be issued in most cases. If, however, it can be
demonstrated that disclosures about a particular tool are especially likely to
facilitate problematic free riding, courts are free to bestow further exclusivity by
covering the mandated disclosure with a protective order.
F. SECRECY AND THE DISTORTION OF DEMAND FOR FORENSIC EVIDENCE
TECHNOLOGY
Though the innovation benefits of trade secret privileges for forensic
evidence technology are likely to be minimal at best, secrecy has the potential
to skew market demand for such innovation in socially undesirable directions.
Forensic technology is not a private good. It should be designed to serve public
purposes. Society’s goals and values, as enshrined in the Constitution and the
traditions of the criminal justice system, include preferences for more accurate
law enforcement, for avoiding false convictions, as well as for practicalities such
as lower cost. As already discussed, the “customers” for forensic evidence
technology are forensic laboratories and, ultimately, prosecutors and law
enforcement agencies. Market demand for innovation in this market, like others,
is driven by customer demand. The customers in this market are agents for the
public, but imperfect agents, who have various personal and professional
motivations, including a desire for “success” in their cases, a preference for
lower costs, a concern with accuracy and, probably most immediately, a desire
for tools that produce persuasive, admissible evidence.
Because “customer” preferences in this market are only partially aligned
with society’s goals and values, there is likely to be a mismatch between the
technology that would best serve society and the technology that these customers
demand. On top of these principal-agent issues, forensic evidence tools
purchased from private companies are likely to be “credence goods,” meaning
that it will be difficult for purchasers to assess their quality through use. The
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failures of market demand associated with credence goods are commonly
addressed by regulation, often involving mandated explanation or disclosure.178
In the criminal justice system, admissibility standards, judicial gatekeeping
and the adversarial process are designed to address essentially these problems,
though they are not usually described in market failure terms. Judicial
gatekeeping and adversarial testing of evidence are foundations of the U.S.
criminal justice system and a primary means for closing the gap between social
values and prosecutor preferences. If admissibility doctrine, judicial practice and
trade secrecy privilege combine to undermine the efficacy of these mechanisms,
demand in the market for forensic evidence tool innovation will be misaligned
with public values. This sort of market failure cannot be remedied by
competition because competitors all respond to the same, misaligned demand
signals. Rather than merely slowing the pace of innovation in forensic evidence
technology, demand misalignment produces a portfolio of innovative activity
that is mis-directed and fails to serve society’s goals and values.179 Admissibility
and trade secret privilege doctrines thus play crucial roles in regulating the
market for forensic evidence tools.
In a follow-on article, we will argue, these demand-side problems are
exacerbated for software-based technologies because current approaches to
admissibility and validation fail to account adequately for software’s distinctive
nature. In light of the growing importance of software-based forensic tools, the
inadequacy of current approaches is a matter of major concern. The FST debacle
illustrates the way that secret source code can hide post-validation modifications
and questionable “fixes.” Aside from failing to uncover this sort of misconduct,
judges have been willing to allow developers of proprietary code to rely solely
on lab-based input-output testing that is not properly designed to uncover coding
errors. These inadequate doctrinal and judicial standards, combined with the
conflation of precedent with scientific acceptance, strip these markets of
incentives for the sorts of innovations that would improve code quality,
generalizability and dependability.
III. A FEW WORDS ABOUT INCIDENTAL AND DUAL-PURPOSE
FORENSIC EVIDENCE TOOLS
So far, we have implicitly assumed that forensic evidence technology is
developed and marketed solely for use by crime labs for the purpose of analyzing
forensic evidence, such that innovation is driven mostly by the preferences of
law enforcement agencies and prosecutors. While many, if not most, forensic
evidence tools fit this pattern, undoubtedly some are also used or marketed for

178. For discussions of the credence goods problem in other markets, see Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical
Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in the Drug Industry, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017);
Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 953 (2000).
179. See Lev-Aretz & Strandburg, supra note 107, at 4.
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other commercial purposes. Some technologies may be developed primarily for
standard commercial markets and then used as forensic evidence tools at a later
time. From an incentive perspective, such incidental forensic uses are
unimportant, however, because unanticipated disclosure cannot depress a priori
incentives for innovation. Some technologies, however, presumably are
developed with both forensic and other applications in mind. It is possible that
the expectation of court-ordered disclosure could affect incentives for
innovation of such dual-purpose technologies. To get a basic handle on whether
and how our analysis might differ for such dual-purpose technologies, it is
helpful to distinguish two possibilities.
One possibility is that first mover advantages, along with trade secrecy and
other intellectual property protections might be sufficiently robust in ordinary
commercial markets to incentivize the development of a dual-purpose
technology, but the potential for court-mandated disclosure might deter
innovators from marketing the technology for forensic evidence applications.
While this might be a perfectly sensible business strategy, it could be unfortunate
from a public perspective to deprive courts of the evidence that could be
produced by such tools. Another possibility is that some dual-purpose
technologies require such large investments that they can only be recouped by
marketing to both conventional and forensic evidence markets. In such
situations, the fear that court-mandated disclosure could be used to free ride in
the conventional market might be enough to deter innovation completely.
The trade secrecy privilege debate may or may not have much bearing on
innovators’ business decisions for either sort of dual-purpose technology. Recall
that we argued earlier that only a limited amount of free-rideable information is
truly at stake in the trade secret privilege decision, because so much about
principles, methods and validation must be disclosed even under current
admissibility doctrine. That argument carries over to dual-purpose technologies.
Copyright protection is also still available for dual-purpose software, though it
is admittedly easier for free riders to hide infringement in commercial markets,
where they can keep their code secret. It is of course possible that, for some dualpurpose technologies, the marginal free riding in conventional markets
facilitated by court-mandated disclosure of source code and implementation
details could tip the balance. Even for those technologies, a trade secret privilege
in criminal cases is not likely to be justified. Instead, courts could simply employ
protective orders. That is, after all, the approach used in high-stakes commercial
trade secret litigation between competitors.180
In sum, even for dual-purpose technologies, public disclosure may not have
much impact on incentives for innovation. Where significant impact is likely,
disclosure under a protective order might be appropriate. Of course, disclosure
180. Rebecca Wexler, It’s Time to End the Trade Secret Evidentiary Privilege Among Forensic Algorithm
Vendors, BROOKINGS (July 13, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/07/13/its-time-to-endthe-trade-secret-evidentiary-privilege-among-forensic-algorithm-vendors.
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under a protective order would also be one way to proceed for technologies
employed primarily for forensic purposes, such as probabilistic genotyping. As
mentioned earlier, while this approach would be an improvement over current
practice, we do not endorse it because the potential benefits of trade secrecy are
very unlikely to outweigh the social benefits of public disclosure.
CONCLUSION
The evidentiary privilege for trade secrets is premised on a policy of
incentivizing innovations by ensuring that advancements are not immediately
replicable by “free riding” competitors. This Article analyzes the flaws in this
premise in some detail. Rather than reiterate the analysis here, we close with a
hypothetical narrative, based on our probabilistic genotyping case study, that
encapsulates our argument.
Imagine that a court has ordered the disclosure of TrueAllele’s source code
and relevant input parameters and that you have obtained a copy. You decide to
free ride on this disclosure to start a company to market a competing
probabilistic genotyping tool at a discounted rate. But what does this
marketplace look like? As it turns out, even armed with TrueAllele’s source
code, the landscape that greets the free rider is bleak. Two companies have
already secured major contracts with crime labs all across the country. These
companies’ PG tools have been battle-tested in successful admissibility
litigation in dozens of states. They carry binders full of validation studies:
implementations by state crime labs, even the FBI. When you approach your
local crime lab with your new tool, they want to see your validation studies. If
you decide to invest in such studies, it will take you some time to access the
necessary laboratory equipment and samples, conduct the studies and shepherd
them through the process of peer review and publication. When you return,
considerably poorer, to your prospective customer, you find that the tool the lab
currently uses has continued to rack up positive admissibility decisions. Even
when you brandish your published validation studies, the laboratory is reluctant
to take the risk of relying on your untested tool. To make the sale, you are forced
to offer a much deeper discount than you had originally envisioned, leaving you
further in the hole. But you remain optimistic that you will eventually be able to
make inroads on the market. Now it is time for your tool’s first admissibility
hearing. Of course, your tool is also subject to court-mandated disclosure. Mark
Perlin now has access to your source code. Noticing that it looks suspiciously
like his original code, he sues you for copyright infringement. Having no
defense, you are compelled to pay damages and are enjoined from making
further use of the code. Thus ends your foray into the probabilistic genotyping
market. Of course, maybe you were smart enough to consult a copyright attorney
and attempt to modify the code to avoid using any of Perlin’s protected
expression. Now you are even further in the hole (and still not completely certain
that you have avoided copyright infringement). And that is not even to mention
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Perlin’s patents on a “Method and System for DNA Mixture Analysis.”
Apparently free riding is not all it’s cracked up to be.
Now imagine that you are an expert in receipt of the court-mandated
TrueAllele disclosure. You may find the sort of misfeasance illustrated by the
FST debacle. But even if you do not, you may now be able to probe the limits
of validity of TrueAllele’s implementation of probabilistic genotyping. Using
the information you uncover, you might serve as a defense expert in a case that
pushes those limits, avoiding an unjustified guilty verdict. Or, you might see
how to devise a better, more accurate PG tool and decide to try to enter the
market. Even with your improved technology, entering the market will be a
challenge. You will, of course, consult an IP attorney and avoid copying Perlin’s
code. Still, depending on how your technology builds on Perlin’s, you might
have to pay patent royalties or even sell him your improvement. You will still
have to validate your tool and overcome potential customers’ qualms about
admissibility. And you will still have to satisfy market demand that is skewed
toward prosecutorial preferences. As these two hypotheticals illustrate, markets
for forensic evidence technology are far from easy playing fields for free riders.
Even a follow-on innovator faces an uphill market entry battle.
Against the arguments that a trade secrecy privilege is needed to promote
innovation in forensic evidence technology, stand countervailing concerns about
the Constitutional rights and fair treatment of people accused of crimes. These
fundamental rights have been addressed by others and thus are not our focus
here, but they provide an additional yardstick against which the anemic free rider
arguments for trade secrecy must be measured. Our analysis strongly suggests
that the economic arguments for a trade secret privilege for forensic evidence
technology come up short by any measure.
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APPENDIX
A. PROBABILISTIC GENOTYPING TECHNOLOGY
1. Terms
Alleles: Gene variants that are present at predetermined loci in the genome.
In general, each person has two alleles of each gene. If the person’s two alleles
are the same, they are said to be homozygous for that trait. If the person’s two
alleles are different, they are said to be heterozygous for that trait.181
Genotype: The DNA profile (i.e., the composition of alleles) of an
organism.182
Genome: A complete set of genetic information in an organism.183
Heterozygous: When a person’s two alleles at a particular locus are
different.184
Homozygous: When a person’s two alleles at a particular locus are the
same.185
Locus (pl. loci): Fixed positions on a chromosome that contains genetic
information encoding a particular gene or genetic marker.186
Short tandem repeats (STRs): Consecutively repeated units of DNA,
typically in noncoding regions of the genome.187
B. A BRIEF PRIMER ON LIKELIHOOD RATIOS
1. Likelihood Ratios
The LR can be expressed as follows, in the form of a Bayesian conditional
probability:

where Pr(E|S) is the probability the evidence in the DNA mixtures comes from
the suspect, and where Pr(E|U) is the probability the evidence in the DNA

181. Allele, supra note 38.
182. Genotype, SCITABLE BY NATURE EDUC., https://www.nature.com/scitable/definition/genotype-234
(last visited Mar. 21, 2022).
183. Genome, SCITABLE BY NATURE EDUC., https://www.nature.com/scitable/definition/genome-43 (last
visited Mar. 21, 2022).
184. See Allele, supra note 38.
185. Id.
186. BUTLER ET AL., supra note 34, at x.
187. Stephanie Feupe Fotsing, Jonathan Margoliash, Catherine Wang, Shubham Saini, Richard Yanicky,
Sharona Shleizer-Burko, Alon Goren & Melissa Gymrek, The Impact of Short Tandem Repeat Variation on
Gene Expression, 51 NATURE GENETICS 1652, 1652 (2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41588-019-05219.
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mixture comes from an unrelated individual.188 The mathematics underlying PG
software and LRs are somewhat simplified when one considers that the term
PR(E|S) is often expressed as Hp, or the prosecution hypothesis. This number is
often set to 1 since the prosecutor(s) involved in the case would not bring charges
against the POI if they did not fully suspect s/he was the perpetrator.189 PR(E|U)
is often expressed as Hd, or the defense hypothesis.190 This number is often the
random match probability (RMP), a mathematical term that represents the
likelihood of finding the DNA variant from the sample in the random
population.191 In essence, this represents the defense alleging that the particular
DNA in this sample could have been contributed by a random individual, with a
probability equal to the Hd.
2. Quantifying Likelihood Ratios
Likelihood ratios can be astronomically high, with some indicating that it
is tens of millions of times more likely that the suspected individual is a
contributor than an unknown person. This determination would result in cases
where Hd, i.e., the probability of finding that particular allele in the general
population (i.e., 2pq), is extremely small. A simple mathematical analysis
illustrates this concept: if the LR = Hp/Hd, and Hp=1 and Hd (i.e., the RMP, or
2pq) is relatively extremely small, the LR will be a relatively large number. Even
in the simplest genetic situation, where the only possible alleles of the gene of
interest are p and q, p + q = 1 (but in nearly all real-world situations pertinent
to PG technologies, neither p = 1 nor q = 1, and with regards to STR repeats
used in PG, it is possible that both p<<1 and/or q<<1). Even in this simplified
example, the product pq < 1 for all values of p and q, and the product 2pq<1.
This results in LR = 1/n, where n<1. Thus, LR>1.

188.
189.
190.
191.

Coble & Bright, supra note 29, at 219.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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